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INTRODUCTION

One of the great principles of the fourth amendment is that "a
man's house [is] his castle and [is] not to be invaded by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers."' Consequently, the amendment, which was enacted in reaction to the
evils of the general warrant in England and of the writs of assistance in the Colonies,2 outlaws such warrants.8 To implement this
1. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914).
The Court
further observed that this maxim is part of the Unreasonable Search and
Seizure Clause of the amendment. Id.
2. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967); Salmon v. State,
2 Md. App. 513, 518, 235 A.2d 758, 760 (1967). In fact, it has been stated
that the "prime purpose" of the amendment is the protection of the people
from unreasonable invasions of privacy under the unbridled authority of
the general warrant. State v. Daniels, 46 N.J. 428, 436, 217 A.2d 610, 614
(1966); see Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965).
3. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 480, 486 (1965);
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931); Marron
v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 (1927). The general warrant is one
that either does not specify by name or description the individual to be
arrested, or leaves blank spaces for such name or description to be filled
in after the arrest, or does not specify with particularity either the place to
be searched or the property to be seized. See Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98, 100-01 (1959); Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, 55 THE JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 35-36 (1937).

In

short, such a warrant fails to "sufficiently specify the place or person to
be searched [or arrested] or the things to be seized." Salmon v. State,
2 Md. App. 513, 518 n.1, 235 A.2d 758, 760 n.1 (1967). Therefore, the relationship between the incidental search and one conducted under the command of a warrant is triggered by the scope of execution. This means that
if in executing a warrant, peace officers discover any items that could have
been properly seized in a search incident to an arrest, they may lawfully
seize them as an incident of the search conducted under the authority of
the warrant. Thus, in reasonably executing a valid search warrant, peace
officers may seize fruits, instruments, and evidence of any unrelated
crime. United States v. Robinson, 287 F. Supp. 245, 254 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
To hold otherwise would discourage officers from seeking warrants. Id.
It has been deemed advisable to explain the primary distinctions
between the general and the exploratory search, because the courts have
used interchangeably, and with some resultant confusion, the expression
"general exploratory search for evidence of other crimes." E.g., United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 62 (1950); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 153 (1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465
(1932); Porter v. United States, 335 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 983 (1965); United States v. Tate, 209 F. Supp. 762, 765
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mandate, search and arrest 4 warrants are required to describe with
particularity the premises and property to be searched for, and
the persons to be seized.
The topic of specificity requirements does not easily lend itself
to guiding principles of law. Any analysis of particularity must
necessarily rest on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration all
of the surrounding facts and circumstances. 6 There are, of course,
a few steady rules, for example, the prohibition against warrantless
entry into a private dwelling to conduct a search,7 and the preference which the Supreme Court accords warrants." But search and
seizure law is in a continuous state of development. Now, as a
result of the rejection of the "mere evidence" rule,9 the types of
(D. Del. 1962); People v. Cox, 69 Cal. Rptr. 410, 413 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
4. Since the amendment applies to both search and arrest warrants,
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958), it will encompass
an arrest of the person, State v. Licari, 153 Conn. 127, 132, 214 A.2d 900,
902 (1965), and will protect against his unreasonable seizure. Terry v.
Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (1968); Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823, 834 (5th
Cir. 1965) (concurring opinion); People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 57,
238 N.E.2d 307, 310, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898. 903 (1968).
5. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927);
United States v. Wroblewski, 105 F.2d 444, 446-47 (7th Cir. 1939); People
v. Rainey, 14 N.Y.2d 35, 38, 197 N.E.2d 527, 529, 248 N.Y.S.2d 33, 36 (1964).
6. See State v. Daniels, 46 N.J. 428, 436, 217 A.2d 610, 614 (1966).
7. For example, probable cause is insufficient to justify a warrantless search of a home for contraband or other articles subject to seizure.
Only as an incident to a lawful arrest therein may a warrantless search be
conducted. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613 (1961); Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497, 498 (1958); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 32, 33 (1925). People v. Marshall, 442 P.2d 665, 668, 69 Cal. Rptr.
585, 588 (1968); see Commonwealth v. Cookfield, 246 A.2d 381, 384 (Pa.
1968). Entry therein to effect a valid warrantless arrest is permitted. State
v. Hand, 101 N.J. Super. 43, 55, 242 A.2d 888, 890 n.1 (Essex Co. 1968), and
so too is entry to render first aid or in an emergency. For factual examples
of exceptional circumstances justifying warrantless entry, see the authorities collected in Mascolo, Inter-Spousal Consent To Unreasonable Searches
And Seizures: A Constitutional Approach, 40 CONN. B.J. 351, 354 n.19
(1966).
8. E.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106, 107, 109 (1965);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 270 (1960).
In a close case, a search by warrant may well be
upheld, whereas the same search without warrant may fall. See Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); United States v. Lewis, 392 F.2d 377,
379 (2d Cir. 1968); Scott v. State, 243 A.2d 609, 614 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1968); State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 244 A.2d 101, 103 (1968).
9. Announced in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309-11
(1921), and overruled in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-01, 310
(1967). Consequently, a search warrant, unless forbidden by statute, may
now be obtained for the seizure of mere evidence of crime. United States
v. Robinson, 287 F. Supp. 245, 250 (N.D. Ind. 1968). Prior to Warden,
searches were generally considered to be limited to contraband, fruits, and

property that may be legally sought are far more variable.'0
In view of these factors, the topic of specificity requirements
for warrants is appropriate and timely. Unless law enforcement
officials, as well as magistrates and prosecutors, develop a working
familiarity with such requirements, "many a good criminal case
[will turn] 'sour' for the prosecution, an outcome which, while
helpful to the criminal involved, scarcely aids in the promotion of
true justice.""
A note of explanation is here in order. As shall be seen, the
scope of execution of a search warrant may render a search and
seizure invalid even though the specificity requirements of the
amendment have been satisfied in the warrant. When this
happens, the search degenerates into a general search. Similarly,
an exploratory search for evidence of crime arises where a warrantless search incidental to a valid arrest crosses the bounds of reasonableness and ceases to be subordinate to the arrest. The exploratory search is always warrantless. It will ensue when, because of
its intensity or scope, it ceases to be subordinate to the primary
purpose to arrest and becomes motivated by a desire to search.
The general search will arise in one of three situations: either
the search warrant itself fails to meet specificity requirements;
the search extends beyond the four corners of a sufficiently particular warrant; or an arrest is resorted to as a pretext to search
for evidence of crime. See SOBEL, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE LAW
OF SEARCH & SEIZURE 60, 74-75 (Kings County Crim. Bar Asso. 1964).

The importance of the incidental search apropos specificity requirements for warrants arises when property or evidence of crime
not specified in a warrant, or not related to the arrest, is uncovered
during a search being conducted either pursuant to the warrant's
authority or in support of the arrest. In such a situation the
instrumentalities of crime. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367
(1964), for a summarized classification of that property which could be
incidentally seized prior to Warden. Obviously, if "mere evidence" could
not be incidentally seized regardless of the scope of the search, it could
not be seized under authority of a warrant. Therefore, the classification
contained in Preston was a limitation upon both warrantless and warranted searches.
10. E.g., United States v. Robinson, 287 F. Supp. 245, 255 (N.D. Ind.
1968) (permitting the seizure of items of personal clothing, washcloths, and
ammunition under a warrant for criminal instrumentalities); People v.
Williams, 240 N.E.2d 645, 650 (Ill. 1968) (involving a warrant for firearms,
ammunition, and bloodstained wearing apparel). State v. Seefeldt, 51
N.J. 472, 490, 242 A.2d 322, 331 (1968) (sustaining a search warrant for
"bloodstained clothes or rags"); State v. Reid, 441 P.2d 742, 744 n.1 (N.M.
1968) (shorts and shoes seized during an incidental search).
11. People v. Hendricks, 45 Misc. 2d 7, 12, 256 N.Y.S.2d 78, 83-84
(Sup. Ct. 1965). The importance of warrants may be gauged by the fact
that a warrantless search or seizure is prima facie illegal. Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); People v. Ruiz, 71 Cal. Rptr. 519,
522 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968); see Commonwealth v. Cockfield, 246 A.2d 381,
383 (Pa. 1968). So, too, is a warrantless arrest. State v. Spellman, 153
Conn. 65, 69, 212 A.2d 413, 415 (1965).
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question will arise as to the reasonableness of the discovery vis-avis the warrant or the arrest. If the scope of execution is reasonable, then the fruits of the discovery may be rightfully seized.
If not, then they are the product of either a general or an exploratory search and may not be used for prosecution purposes.
I.

THE CORRELATION BETWEEN PROBABLE CAUSE AND SPECIFICITY

Pervading the whole atmosphere of warrants under the fourth
amendment is the requirement of probable cause. A warrant,
whether for arrest or to search, may issue only upon probable
cause, 12 and the standard of probable cause for both warrants is
the same. If a peace officer is unable to establish probable cause
for a search warrant, he will be unable to establish probable cause
for the issuance of an arrest warrant. 13
Another indispensable requirement for the issuance of a warrant is specificity. That is, the place or property to be searched
for, and the person to be seized, must be described in the warrant
with particularity. This particularity of description must also meet
14
constant standards.
It may be readily seen then that the cardinal rules for the
(1) a valid determination of the
issuance of all warrants are:
existence of probable cause by "a neutral and detached magistrate;" 15 and (2) the issuance by him of a warrant that satisfies the
particularity requirements of the fourth amendment. Only when
these two rules are satisfied will a warranted intrusion upon privacy be legally countenanced.' 6
Since no valid warrant may issue without satisfying the dual
requirements of probable cause and specificity, it is imperative that
the correlation between the two be understood. Although probable cause and specificity may not readily appear to be related
components of fourth-amendment activity, they must be considered
together in assessing the reasonableness of any given arrest or
search and seizure.
12. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107 (1965); Government
of Virgin Islands v. Rijos, 285 F. Supp. 126, 131 (D.V.I. 1968); Drahosh v.
State, 442 P.2d 44, 46 (Alaska 1968); Johns v. State, 240 N.E.2d 60, 65 (Ind.
1968) (the absence of probable cause will render a warrant fatally defective); People v. Grossman, 45 Misc. 2d 557, 568, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266, 277
(Sup. Ct. 1965); see Commonwealth v. Altizer, 245 A.2d 692, 694 n.12 (Pa.
Super. 1968).
13. United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443, 446 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds on reh., 394 F.2d 452, 454 (1968).
App. 1968).
14. People v. Staes, 235 N.E.2d 882, 885 (Ill.
15. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
16. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309-10 (1967).

The protection of privacy lies at the "core" of the fourth
amendment 17 in order to protect the individual from "unwarranted
intrusions into his privacy."18 Reasonableness is the essence of all
legitimate arrest and search-and-seizure activity.19 In assessing
reasonableness under the Warrant Clause, the element of probable
cause is indispensable; 20 "'probable cause' is the standard by
which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness."'" Probable cause "requires a
proper showing not only that a crime has been or is being committed, but also that the evidence of the crime is upon the person
or within the place or thing to be searched." 22 But in assessing the
legality of arrest and search-and-seizure conduct, not only probable
cause, but specificity as well is demanded. If specificity is nonexistent, or is inadequately stated, the police would be free to
conduct a general search 3 or otherwise expose innocent persons
and premises to a search not based upon probable cause. 24 A working relationship between probable cause and specificity is therefor
created.25 Thus, while probable cause is the standard by which
privacy is reasonably invaded, specificity will define that invasion
and will govern law enforcement conduct after peace officers "have
entered the individual's zone of privacy." 26 In short, if there is no
17. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
18. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958).
19. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1968);
State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 243 A.2d 240, 253 (1968); State v. Romeo,
43 N.J. 188, 206, 203 A.2d 23, 32 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 970 (1965).
This is because the amendment only forbids unreasonable conduct. E.g.,
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147
(1925).
20. Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968).
The only exception
applies in the "stop-and-frisk" situation. Id. at 1879, 1882, 1883, 1884-85.
21. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967). It is significant that the Court, in discussing the relationship between reasonableness
and probable cause, saw fit to cite a reasonable belief that specified goods
will be uncovered in a particular building as an example of the standard
of probable cause under the Warrant Clause. Id. at 535.
22. Frey v. State, 3 Md. App. 38, 44, 237 A.2d 774, 778 (1968); accord,
Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925) (there must be "reasonable grounds at the time of. . . the issuance of the warrant for the belief
that the law was being violated on the premises to be searched"); Scott
v. State, 243 A.2d 609, 613-14 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968); Salmon v. State,
2 Md. App. 513, 519, 235 A.2d 758, 761 (1967); State v. Seefelt, 51 N.J.
472, 490, 242 A.2d 322, 332 (1968) (there must be a "reasonable belief that
the items sought might be found at the premises to be searched").
23. United States ex rel. Ametrane v. Gable, 276 F. Supp. 555, 559
(E.D. Pa. 1967).
24. United States v. Kenny, 164 F. Supp. 891, 893 (D.D.C. 1958).
25. State v. Sheppard, 46 N.J. 526, 529, 218 A.2d 156, 157 (1966); see
United States v. Wroblewski, 105 F.2d 444, 446 (7th Cir. 1939).
26. United States ex rel. Ametrane v. Gable, 276 F. Supp. 555, 559
(E.D. Pa. 1967).
Particularity of description in the warrant is necessary in order to
identify the place [or person] to be searched and the things to be
seized. It both defines and limits the scope of the search and
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2
specificity, there is no probable cause.

II.

A.

SEARCH WARRANTS

Introductory Comments

A search warrant has been variously characterized as an
"arbitrary form of process; '28 "a sharp and heavy police weapon; '29
and "an instrument of oppression."' 0 In view of this, procedures
required for the execution of warrants are liberally construed in
favor of the individual, 31 and must be carefully circumscribed to
prevent unreasonable invasions of the privacies of life.3 2 The
courts have therefore strictly construed the rules of law applicable
33
to search warrants.
The courts prefer searches conducted under the authority of
warrants to those conducted without benefit thereof. 34 Therefore,
warrants, and their supporting affidavits, are interpreted in a common-sense, rather than a hypertechnical, fashion. 5 To do otherseizure and by its particularity of description protects individuals
from unreasonable search and seizure. The requirement of particularity of description in the warrant outlaws the vicious practice
of using warrants for general search and seizure.
United States v. Wroblewski, 105 F.2d 444, 446-47 (7th Cir. 1939).
27. This does not mean that specificity determines the prior existence
of probable cause. For example, probable cause to believe that a particular crime has been or is being committed can be established without a
showing that a particular person has committed it. And, it can be shown
that particular criminal proceeds have been obtained by persons unknown
and removed to parts unknown. It is only when an attempt is made to
arrest or search an individual for crime, or to search for criminal instrumentalities or proceeds, that the question of specificity arises.
28. State v. Cesero, 146 Conn. 375, 378, 151 A.2d 338, 341 (1959).
29. State v. Guthrie, 90 Me. 448, 450, 38 A. 368, 369 (1897).
30. People v. Wiedeman, 324 Ill. 66, 68, 154 N.E. 432 (1926).
31. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932).
32. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967).
33. Keiningham v. United States, 287 F.2d 126, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
United States v. Zovluck, 274 F. Supp. 385, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); State v.
Cesero, 146 Conn. 375, 378, 151 A.2d 338, 340 (1959). For example, statutes
governing the issuance of search warrants will be strictly construed, State
v. Almori, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 641, 643-44, 222 A.2d 820, 822 (Tr. Div. 1966),
and "must strictly comply with the standard [of constitutional reasonableness] enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States." United
States ex rel. DeNegris v. Menser, 360 F.2d 199, 204 (2d Cir. 1966).
34. See authorities cited note 8 supra. This preference is demonstrated by the rule that condemns, "except in certain carefully defined
classes of cases," and absent a valid consent, all warrantless searches of
private property. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
35. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); United States
v. Scolnick, 392 F.2d 320, 323 (3d Cir. 1968); United States v. Delia, 283 F.
Supp. 470, 474 (E.D. Pa. 1968); State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 244 A.2d
101, 104 (1968); Commonwealth v. Peyton, 243 A.2d 202, 203 (Pa. Super.
1968).

wise would "tend to discourage police officers 3 from submitting
their evidence to a judicial officer before acting. 37 Because of the
courts' preference for warrants, it is presumed, in the absence of a
showing of illegality, that search warrants are valid.38 This presumption of legality also applies to supporting affidavits, 9 as well
as to the proper performance by the issuing magistrate of his
the validity of a
official duties.40 Consequently, one who attacks
41
search warrant carries the burden of persuasion.
Even though a search warrant may be issued, there is no
guarantee that the search conducted under its authority will uncover the evidence sought, or, for that matter, any incriminating
evidence whatsoever. This failure will not affect the validity of
the warrant, 42 nor will the quantity of evidence uncovered. 43 The
36. Who are not "legal technicians." Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
37. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
38. Moore v. State, 244 Ark. 1197, 429 S.W.2d 122, 125 (1968); Commonwealth v. Coco, 235 N.E.2d 555, 556 (Mass. 1968); State v. Gaudiosi, 97
N.J. Super. 565, 571, 235 A.2d 680, 683 (App. Div. 1967); Winger v. State,
43 Okla. Crim. 140, 141, 277 P. 947 (1929).
39.

Id.; 1

VARON,

SEARCHES,

SEIZURES AND

IMMUNITIES

308 (1961)

[hereinafter cited as VARON].
40. United States v. Haskins, 345 F.2d 111, 113 (6th Cir. 1965) and
authorities cited therein. In passing upon the legality of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant, a reviewing court will not pause to consider
whether the issuing magistrate should have proceeded in a different
manner, but rather will consider only whether the procedure followed
met constitutional standards. Sherrick v. Eyman, 389 F.2d 648, 652 (9th
Cir. 1968).
41. Moore v. State, 244 Ark. 1197, 429 S.W.2d 122, 125 (1968); People
v. Wilson, 256 A.C.A. 458, 64 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert.
denied, 88 S.Ct. 1653 (1968); Lumpkins v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.2d 535,
536 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); State v. Gaudiosi, 97 N.J. Super. 565, 571, 235
A.2d 680, 683 (App. Div. 1967); Winger v. State, 43 Okla. Crim. App. 140,
141, 277 P. 947 (1929); see People v. West Diversity Ave., Second Fl. Apt.,
Chicago, 238 N.E.2d 229, 230 (Ill. App. 1968) (where one challenges the
legality of a search warrant on the ground that it was issued on the basis
of evidence obtained by illegal eavesdropping, he has the burden of proving the use of an eavesdropping device). On the other hand, where the
legality of a search warrant is attacked, and the information forming the
basis for its issuance was obtained as the result of an earlier entry to
execute an arrest warrant, the burden of proof will rest with the prosecution to show that the first entry was lawful. If this burden is not sustained,
the search warrant will fail for having been issued upon illegally obtained
information. People v. Cox, 66 Cal. Rptr. 410, 413 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
Of course, if the warrant is illegal, the search conducted thereunder will
also be illegal, thereby rendering its fruits inadmissible. United States v.
Delia, 283 F. Supp. 470, 472, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1968). Finally, on a motion to
suppress, the prosecution has no obligation to show a connection between
the items seized and the crime being prosecuted, as the burden is on the
movant to show their irrelevancy.

United States v. Robinson, 287 F. Supp.

245, 255 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
42. United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595, 597 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 859 (1962); United States v. Doe, 19 F.R.D. 1, 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
43. United States v. Doe, 19 F.R.D. 1, 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1956). Of course,
if the "quantity" includes evidence not specified in the warrant, this may
affect its admissibility at trial.
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actual discovery of incriminating evidence has no bearing upon the
warrant's validity. 4 Finally, the validity of the warrant is determined as of the date of issuance. 45 Validity is not correlated to
date of execution, except as modified and limited in time by a
judge-made rule or a controlling statute.46
B.

4
The Standardof Specificity

7

In order to satisfy the specificity requirements of the fourth
amendment, a search warrant must describe the premises or person
to be searched, and the items to be seized, with sufficient particularity for the executing officer to locate and identify the same from
the face of the warrant with reasonable effort or certainty. 48
Neither a technical4 9 nor a completely accurate 0 description is re44. United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595, 597 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 859 (1962); United States v. Miller, 36 F. Supp. 391, 392 W.D.N.Y.
1941). This is because a search "is not to be made legal by what it turns
up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does not change character
from its success." United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948); accord,
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927); Commonwealth v. Bosurgi,
411 Pa. 56, 68, 190 A.2d 304, 310-11, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 910 (1963).
45. United States v. Doe, 19 F.R.D. 1, 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
46. Id.; see, e.g., Elrod v. Moss, 278 F. 123, 128 (4th Cir. 1921); State
v. Cesero, 146 Conn. 375, 378, 151 A.2d 338, 340-41 (1959) (a search warrant
must be executed within a reasonable time from the date of its issue);
Farmer v. Sellers, 89 S.C. 492, 498-99, 72 S.E. 224, 226-27 (1911) (same);
State v. Pachsa, 102 W. Va. 607, 611, 135 S.E. 908, 910 (1926) (same); FED.
R. Cpam. P. 41(d) (warrant must be executed and returned within 10 days
of the date of its issuance).
47. The standard to be discussed at this time shall be primarily limited
to premises and items of personal property. The requirements for searching and seizing a person will be covered in detail in the discussion infra
of arrest warrants.
48. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925); United States v.
Poppitt, 227 F. Supp. 73, 76 (D. Del. 1964); People v. Estrada, 234 Cal. App.
2d 136, 145-46, 44 Cal. Rptr. 165, 171-72 (1965); State v. Lemon, 212 So. 2d
322, 323-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Fance v. State, 207 So. 2d 331, 333
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Frey v. State, 3 Md. App. 38, 46-47, 237 A.2d 774,
780 (1968); State v. Sheppard, 46 N.J. 526, 530, 218 A.2d 156, 158 (1966);
State v. Costakos, 226 A.2d 695, 696 (R.I, 1967); Bowling v. State, 219 Tenn.
224, 226, 408 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1966); O'Brien v. State, 158 Tenn. 400, 40102, 14 S.W.2d 51 (1929). As to the variety of language used to describe the
specificity required, see the authorities collected in State v. Daniels, 46
N.J. 428, 436-37, 217 A.2d 610, 614 (1966).
For example, a search warrant for specified premises and 'each
and every person' thereon would be too broad, Crossland v. State,
266 P.2d 649, 652 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954), as would be one to
search all persons found on described premises participating in certain enumerated criminal activities. Salmon v. State, 2 Md. App.
513, 235 A.2d 758, 762 (1967); contTa, State v. Cook, 213 So.2d 18,
21-22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), criticized in 4 CalM. L. BULL. 437
(Sept. 1968).
49. State v. Brochu, 237 A.2d 418, 422, 424 (Me. 1967).
50. State v. Daniels, 46 N.J. 428, 437, 217 A.2d 610, 615 (1966).
One

quired. It will be sufficient so long as the description is specific
enough to eliminate any room for the exercise of discretion by the
searcher as to what is sought. 51
As applied to premises, the rule has been stated in these terms:
The test of the sufficiency of the description of the premises is whether it is such that the officer with the search
warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify
the place intended. . . . The question is . ..whether the
physical aspects of the exterior [of the premises are] sufficiently delineated in the warrant to make the intended
property reasonably recognizable. The designation is adequate if the language of the warrant setting forth the
external appearance produces enough information to reasonably identify the premises. . . . The test is not whether
the description is completely accurate in every detail but
rather whether it furnishes a sufficient basis for identification of the property so that it is recognizable from other
adjoining and neighboring properties. 52
Although the standard is clear, its application is complicated
by factual vagaries. A thorough analysis of specificity requirements demands not only a case-by-case approach, but also an examination of the practical mechanics of search procedures and the
scope of search activities.
1. No discretionpermitted to the executing officer
In executing a search warrant, a peace officer is not permitted
any discretion. 53 To sanction such discretion would permit an
individual's right of privacy to be unreasonably invaded at the
whim of law enforcement officers, a situation which would invite
resort to the general search. 4 For example, where a warrant
of the reasons for this is because a warrant is entrusted to a trained law
enforcement officer, 'who is expected to make reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended and to know how to do it." State v.
Ferrara, 98 N.J. Super. 534, 537, 237 A.2d 905, 906 (App. Div. 1968). Another reason is to avoid discouraging law enforcement officers from seeking
warrants. Hence, as long as the description used is as specific as the particular circumstances of the case permit, and there is probable cause, a
search warrant will not be invalidated for lack of specificity. In short,
reasonable latitude must be permitted in the description of the property
sought. United States v. Robinson, 287 F. Supp. 245, 256 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
51. State v. Seefeldt, 51 N.J. 472, 390, 242 A.2d 322, 331 (1968).
The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the
[places to be searched or the] things to be seized makes general
searches under them impossible and prevents the [search of one
place or the] seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be [searched or] taken, nothing is left to
the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
52. State v. Daniels, 46 N.J. 428, 435-37, 217 A.2d 610, 613-15 (1966);
accord, United States v. Pisano, 191 F. Supp. 861, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
United States v. Gomez, 42 F.R.D. 347, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
53. People v. Fitzwater, 67 Cal. Rptr. 190, 194 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968);
State v. Taylor, 28 Conn. Supp. 19, 23, 246 A.2d 898, 900 (Super. Ct. 1968).
54. See authorities cited note 51 supra. It may be noted that the very
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directs a search of an incorrect address, the officer may not take it
upon himself to enter and search premises located at another
address; 55 nor, in executing a warrant for an incorrect address,
may he telephone the issuing magistrate and obtain permission to
change the address. 6 This function cannot be delegated. It belongs exclusively to the issuing magistrate who has the sole power
under the fourth amendment to issue a warrant identifying the
property or person to be searched.57 Another example is where
the supporting affidavit seeks permission to search two places, but
the warrant specifies only one of them. Under the doctrine of in
pari materia both the affidavit and the warrant could be considered as merging as one. A situation would then arise in which
the limits of the search would be determined by the discretion of
the searcher, rather than by the command of the warrant. This is
impermissible and will render the warrant illegal and void. 5
In summary, if the description contained in a warrant invites
discretion by the searcher as to the place to be searched, or the
person and items to be seized, it will fail for lack of specificity and
be classified as general.
2.

Resort to the supportingaffidavit
Courts often face situations involving warrants which fail to
satisfy the requirements of specificity but are nevertheless supported by affidavits which supply the needed description. Whether
fact a warrant has been sought demonstrates a law officer's reluctance
to invade at his discretion the individual's security under the amendment.
See State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 244 A.2d 101, 103 (1968).
55. State v. Lee, 247 La. 553, 563, 172 So. 2d 678, 682 (1965).
56. Id. at 558, 563, 172 So. 2d at 680, 682; accord, United States v.
Constantino, 201 F. Supp. 160, 161 (W.D. Pa. 1962); United States v. Mitchell, 274 F. 128, 131 (N.D. Cal. 1921).
57. United States v. Constantino, 201 F. Supp. 160, 161 (W.D. Pa.
1962). For an amendment of the warrant to be effective, however, the
supporting affidavit must be amended in like manner. United States v.
Mitchell, 274 F. 128, 131 (N.D. Cal. 1921); 1 VARON, supra note 39, at 355
(1961); 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 82, at 896 (1952). This rule forbidding amendments by the searcher applies only to amendments made
prior to execution. Hence, a valid warrant is not rendered invalid, as to
acts performed thereunder prior to amendment, by a subsequent improper
amendment by the executing officer. State ex rel. Henderson v. Cuniff,
30 Tenn. App. 347, 351, 206 S.W.2d 32, 34 (1947) (a valid "John Doe" warrant was stricken after execution and the name of one of the defendants
was inserted). Furthermore, the improper addition of another individual
to be searched will not affect the validity of a warrant that adequately
described premises and the defendant, although it will have this effect as
to the individual whose name was added to the warrant. Walker v. State,
165 Miss. 130, 135, 146 So. 463, 464 (1933).
58. 1 VARON, supra note 39, at 319.

the court may resort to the affidavits to meet the necessary requirements of specificity depends upon the relationship between the
warrant and the affidavit. If the affidavit is attached to the
warrant and the warrant incorporates the affidavit by reference,
resort may be made to the latter to supply the required patticularity. 59 Otherwise, the affidavit may not be used to satisfy the
deficiency. 0
Not only may the affidavit save the deficiencies of description
in the warrant but the affidavit will also define the limits of the
description. For example, a more detailed description in the warrant than that contained in the affidavit will thereby narrow the
scope of permissible search.6 1 But the warrant-description will not
be permitted to go beyond the affidavit-description, which is con2
trolling.
The affidavit has a further controlling effect upon the warrant.
This is in the realm of time: it must not postdate the warrant. If
it does, the warrant is void. 63
59. People v. Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d 672, 673, 279 N.Y.S.2d 836, 837-38
(N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1967); O'Brien v. State, 158 Tenn. 400, 402, 14 S.W.2d
51 (1929); see People v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86, 96, 233 N.E.2d 818, 823-24,
286 N.Y.S.2d 801, 809 (1967), cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 1436 (1968) (applying
the same rule to sworn supporting testimony before issuing magistrate);
People v. Brown, 40 Misc. 2d 35, 41, 242 N.Y.S.2d 555, 562 (N.Y. City Crim.
Ct. 1963). Some authorities have complicated this rule because they
interpret the affidavit as an integral parttof the warrant. Therefore, "it
is permissible to look to the affidavit as well as the warrant since the
affidavit is a part of the warrant and incorporated by reference therein."
Frey v. State, 3 Md. App. 38, 47, 237 A.2d 774, 780 (1968); accord, 1 VARON,
supra note 39, at 319; see Fry v. United States, 9 F.2d 38, 39 (9th Cir. 1925),
cert. denied, 270 U.S. 646 (1926); People v. DeLago, 16 N.Y.2d 289, 290,
213 N.E.2d 659, 660, 266 N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 963
(1966); Ellison v. State, 186 Tenn. 581, 583, 212 S.W.2d 387, 388 (1948).
Whether these cases were concerned with warrants that actually incorporated the affidavits by reference is unclear. Although the affidavit
may thus be resorted to to determine the warrant's sufficiency, the sufficiency of the affidavit itself must be determined from its own face. Wangrow v. United States, 399 F.2d 106, 114 (8th Cir. 1968).
60. People v. Staes, 235 N.E.2d 882, 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). In
Staes the Court intimated that even a sufficiently specific affidavit that
had been attached to the deficient warrant and incorporated therein by
reference would probably not have saved the warrant. The description
contained in the warrant itself should be sufficiently particular so as to
leave the searcher no discretion. Id.
61. Commonwealth v. Cuddy, 231 N.E.2d 368, 371 (Mass. 1967). On
the other hand, where a warrant is couched in the generic term "contraband," and the affidavit specifies the contraband sought, they may be read
together to determine what is covered by the warrant. People v. Hendricks, 45 Misc. 2d 7, 9-10, 256 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (a warrant
for the "proceeds of various larcenies and burglaries" will authorize the
seizure of a revolver referred to in the affidavit). This rule has been
interpreted to be limited to contraband searches. People v. Bosco, 290
N.Y.S.2d 481, 484 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1968).
62. State v. Constanzo, 76 Ida. 19, 22, 276 P.2d 959, 960 (1954).
63. Larkins v. State, 213 Tenn. 520, 525, 376 S.W.2d 459, 462 (1964);
Harvey v. State, 166 Tenn. 227, 228-229, 60 S.W.2d 420 (1933) (testimony
of issuing magistrate inadmissible to show that date appearing on affi-
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C. The Scope of PermissibleSearch
The scope of a search to be conducted under a warrant is predetermined by the issuing magistrate. In determining this scope,
the magistrate must consider the nature of the crime under investigation, which in turn will determine the property sought. Similarly, the property sought will limit the scope of the search.6 4 If,
however, the warrant is defective for lack of specificity, then the
scope of the search will not save it. That is, if the warrant itself
sets no readily definable limits, then a reasonably conducted
search will not validate the warrant. The warrants validity depends upon the showing of probable cause made before the issuing
magistrate. Thus, the protection of the fourth amendment will
not be measured retrospectively, and specificity is required "to
protect from searches everyone except those against whom probable cause has been demonstrated." 65
From these rules has evolved the cardinal principle underlying
the interrelationship between specificity and scope of execution:
the scope of execution can render a search and seizure invalid
under a sufficiently particular warrant, but a nonspecific warrant
will not be saved by the limiting scope of its execution.
We have seen that the searcher is not permitted to transgress
the limits to the scope of a search permitted under the warrant.
This limitation, however, does not constitutionally define the absolute scope of a given search. The limits defined in the warrant
may themselves be too broad. Although evidence which is seized
may be within the description of the warrant, this is not determinative of the issue of legality if its reach exceeds the bounds
permitted by the fourth amendment.6 The standard of specificity
has a constitutional origin which transcends the language contained in any warrant. Once a law enforcement officer has entered
the constitutional zone of privacy, he must act within limits defined
davit was a clerical error, that, in fact, both dates should have been the
same, as the affidavit had been made and the warrant issued at the same
time).
64. SOBEL, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF SEARCH & SFAZURE 73, 74
(Kings County Crim. Bar. Asso. 1964).
65. State v. Ratushny, 82 N.J. Super. 499, 506, 198 A.2d 131, 135
(App. Div. 1964). See notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
66. United States v. Markis, 352 F.2d 860, 864 (2d Cir. 1965), vacated
on other grounds, 387 U.S. 425 (1967). For example, where police officers,
in executing a search warrant for books on specified premises, seized
300,000 books, of which only 60,000 were of 5 of the 9 titles designated in
the supporting affidavits, it was held that the search had become general,
thereby rendering it void in its entirety. People v. Bosco, 290 N.Y.S.2d 481,

486 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1968).

by strict specificity. 7 In short, "[t]he scope of the search must
be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." 68 For example, a search warrant
for all personal property, furniture, and fixtures found at
specified premises is not too broad.69 But a search for "books,

records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist
Party of Texas, and the operations of the Communist Party in

70
Texas," is general.

67. United States v. Thomas, 282 F. Supp. 729, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
The reasons for this have been aptly put:
The manner in which the seizure and search were conducted is, of
course, as vital a part of the inquiry as whether they were warranted at all. The Fourth Amendment proceeds as much by limitations upon the scope of governmental action as by imposing preconditions upon its initiation ....

The entire deterrent purpose of

the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment rests on the assumption that 'limitations upon the
fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest itself'. .

.

. Thus, evi-

dence may not be introduced if it was discovered by means of a
seizure and search which were not reasonably related in scope to
the justification for their initiation.
Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883-84 (1968) (quoting from Judge Learned
Hand's off-repeated aphorism in United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914
(2d Cir. 1930) ); accord, Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 188 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959); Zimmermann v. Wilson, 105 F.2d
583, 585 (3d Cir. 1939). In this regard, the nature of the search and the
things sought are an important circumstance in assessing reasonableness.
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 152 (1947); Giacona v. United States,
257 F.2d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958).
68. Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878 (1968). One must always be
cognizant of the fact that simply because law enforcement officers are
armed with a search warrant will not insulate them from the necessity of
conducting a reasonable search. They will still be required to conduct the
search in a reasonable manner. E.g., United States ex rel. Manduchi v.
Tracy, 350 F.2d 658, 660 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 943 (1965).
69. Commonwealth v. Coco, 235 N.E.2d 555, 556 (Mass. 1968) (a gambling prosecution). But see Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346, 347
(1957) (invalidating the warrantless seizure of the entire contents of a
house and their removal some two hundred miles away to an F.B.I.
office).
70. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 480, 486 (1965). It should be
noted that the primary distinction between Stanford and Coco, cited note
69 supra, lies in the quality of the evidence seized rather than in the actual
scope of the two searches involved. In fact, in Stanford the Court specifically left open the question whether the description "would have been
too generalized" had the property sought been contraband. Id. at 486. That
the nature of the property sought might have a bearing on whether the
warrant's description is general has been intimated before by the Court.
E.g., Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961). This
approach has been endorsed. E.g., United States v. Joseph, 174 F. Supp.
539, 544 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (recognizing that less specificity is required in a
warrant for gambling equipment and paraphernalia than would be demanded in one for stolen goods), aff'd on other grounds, 278 F.2d 504, 505
(3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 823 (1960); see People v. Bosco,
290 N.Y.S.2d 481, 485 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1968) (recognizing its existence).
This differentiation, it is submitted, is irrelevant, because the scope of
the invasion of privacy is as great in the one instance as it is in the other.
Since the desire for privacy may be legitimately presumed universal, it
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1. Some representative examples
A valid search warrant for firearms within a specified residence will permit seizure from a moving van belonging to a common carrier parked in front of the residence, where the evidence
shows that the firearms had just been removed from the residence
and placed in the van at the time of seizure. 71 A warrant for a
warehouse and its appurtenances located at a designated address
on West 33rd Street in Los Angeles and occupied by a specified
trucking company is sufficient to reach, as such an appurtenance, a
dismantled company van found at a gate on 32nd Street and which
is used for storage as an adjunct or accessory to the warehouse.7 2 A
warrant for "the apartment numbered 106 Pleasant St. Cambridge
(occupied by) Louis Nickas," having "1st 2nd floors and the basement" will authorize a search only of the premises of the occupier
designated in the warrant. 73 And, a warrant for a principal building will cover outhouses, vehicles upon the premises, and other
places appurtenant to the building, provided they are all under the
74
control of the person or persons named in the warrant.
cannot be argued that one suspected of harboring contraband is less sensitive to invasions of privacy than is one suspected of harboring controversial or seditious thoughts and reading materials. Furthermore, much of the
history concerned with the abuse of power under the authority of the general warrant dealt with the pernicious writs of assistance, which, in turn,
were concerned with searches for smuggled goods, the traditional type of
contraband. In fact, the Court in Stanford alluded to this very historical
fact in outlining the background to the enactment of the fourth amendment.
379 U.S. at 481.
71. United States v. Thoresen, 281 F. Supp. 598, 614 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
The court felt that to require another warrant for the van would be "needlessly ritualistic." The seizure from the van did not, under the circumstances, constitute an invasion of privacy significantly different from that
permitted by the warrant for the residence. Id. It probably constituted a
lesser invasion. The better reasoning would have been that although the
warrant did not reach to the van, the officers, after searching the residence without success, had probable cause to believe under the peculiar
circumstances existing that the firearms would be located within the van.
For this, they would not have required a warrant. E.g., Carroll v.
,United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S.
694, 700 (1931).
72. People v. Fitzwater, 67 Cal. Rptr. 190, 195-96 (Dist. Ct. App.
1968). The court emphasized the fact that no evidence established that
the entire lot was other than a single integral unit under defendant's control. It did caution, however, that its decision was not to be interpreted as
a general endorsement of the term "appurtenances" as an "omnibus appendage to descriptions in search warrants." Id. at 195.
73. Commonwealth v. Lillis, 349 Mass. 422, 425, 209 N.E.2d 186, 188
(1965). Since the apartment did not actually include the second floor, the
warrant would be no authority to search above the first floor. Id.
74. State v. Brochu, 237 A.2d 418, 422-24 (Me. 1967); Worden v.
State, 197 Tenn. 340, 343-344, 273 S.W.2d 139, 141 (1954) (dictum); Peters

On the other hand, a warrant for specified premises and all
motor vehicles located thereon will not reach to a vehicle parked
just outside of the premises, in the absence of evidence that the
owner or occupier of the vehicle was a servant of or acting in
concert with the owner or possessor of the premises.75 Nor will
a warrant for particular premises and any vehicle found thereon
authorize a search of a vehicle which did not belong to any person
designated in the warrant.76 In like manner, a warrant for a public
garage will not permit a search of vehicles belonging to strangers
to the process. 7 7 And a warrant for a person or premises only will
not extend to vehicles parked in front on a public highway.78
Finally, a warrant for "a container or vile containing methyl alcohol" will not cover a funnel, glass jars, and a cloth; 79 nor will one
for stolen savings stamps extend to stolen postage stamps;80 or
one for jewelry, a weapon, and other contraband extend to airline
tickets. 8'
2.

Evidence bearing a reasonable relationto the
purpose of the search

During the execution of a search warrant, law enforcement
officers will frequently uncover items which are reasonably or
closely related to the purpose of the search but which have not been
specified in the warrant. The courts have generally allowed the
seizure of these items; 2 but they have not always permitted such
a seizure by extending the permissible scope of the search authorv. State, 187 Tenn. 455, 457, 215 S.W.2d 822, 823 (1948). But a search in
the lobby of a building is unauthorized under a warrant for a particular
office in the building. United States v. Zovluck, 274 F. Supp. 385, 390
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
75. Perkins v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Ky. Ct. App.
1964).
76. State v. Sircy, 215 Tenn. 1, 7, 383 S.W.2d 37, 41 (1964).
77. O'Niel v. State, 65 Okla. Crim. App. 398, 400, 88 P.2d 380, 381
(1939).
78. State v. Penna, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 421, 423, 233 A.2d 708, 709-10
(Tr. Div. 1967); State v. Parsons, 83 N.J. Super. 430, 447, 200 A.2d 340, 349
(App. Div. 1964) (such a search will not invalidate a lawful search of the
premises); Dolen v. State, 187 Tenn. 663, 667, 216 S.W.2d 351, 353 (1948)
(premises belonged to mother of vehicle's owner); see People v. Bosco,
290 N.Y.S.2d 481, 485 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1968) (dictum).
79. State v. Brochu, 237 A.2d 418, 420, 424 (Me. 1967).
80. Aron v. United States, 382 F.2d 965, 973 (8th Cir. 1967). If, however, the postage stamps are uncovered during a reasonable execution of
the warrant for the savings stamps, they may be properly seized as an
incident to an arrest for an in-presence crime. E.g., Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1947).
81. People v. Hendricks, 45 Misc. 2d 7, 12, 256 N.Y.S.2d 78, 83 (Sup.
Ct. 1965). See United States ex rel. Nickens v. LaValle, 391 F.2d 123, 126-27
(2d Cir. 1968) (a seizure of newspaper clippings under a warrant for keys,
lock picks, and machines is improper).
82. People v. Sohmers, 55 Misc. 2d 925, 928, 286 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716
(N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1968); see Kaplan, Search and Seitzure: A No-Man's
Land in the CriminalLaw, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 474, 481 (1961).
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ized by the warrant. The authorization will be dichotomized on
the basis of the nature of the goods discovered. This, in turn, will
give rise to the analogous rule permitting the incidental seizure of
evidence of an unrelated crime. 8 Therefore, if the evidence uncovered is not contraband, then seizure will be justified on the
basis of the warrant's authority. 4 However, if the evidence be
83. If entry upon the premises be authorized and the search which
follows be valid, there is nothing in the Fourth Amendment which
property the
inhibits the seizure by law-enforcement agents of ...
possession of which is a crime, even though the officers are not
aware that such property is on the premises when the search is
initiated.
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947); accord, United States v.
Teller, 397 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1968); Heard v. United States, 245 A.2d
125, 126 (D.C. App. 1968) (it is permissible, as an incidental search, to
seize a stolen weapon not mentioned in a search warrant and for which the
defendant had not been arrested). For the distinctions between the general and the exploratory search, see discussion in note 3 supra.
84. E.g., United States v. One 1965 Buick, 392 F.2d 672, 679 (6th Cir.
1968) (more than $300,000 were permitted to be seized under authority of a
warrant for gambling records, instrumentalities, and paraphernalia; although the money could be classified as instrumentalities and paraphernalia, its seizure could just as easily have been justified as contraband);
Harried v. United States, 389 F.2d 281, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (where a search
warrant for certain specified items also included a command to seize
"other instrumentalities of the crime," this was sufficient to permit seizure
of two pairs of scissors and strips of adhesive tape, as the evidence showed
that the victim had been bound and gagged with similar pieces of tape, and
the stab wounds in his body had been made by a sharp instrument consistent with the shape of scissors); United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595, 597,
598 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962) (a warrant for certain
specified furs will justify the seizure of other furs). While Eisner relied
upon Harris,it would have been better for it to have placed stronger emphasis upon the reasonable relationship rule. The mere possession of
furs is not a crime and therefore cannot be presumptively classified as
contraband. Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d 539, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 888 (1963) (permitting the seizure of the victim's
credit card under a warrant for other specified stolen articles); Sanders
v. United States, 238 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir. 1956) (a warrant for currency,
coins, tools, equipment, and clothing, stolen or used in opening a safe will
permit seizure of nonspecified gas masks and manuals outlining the technical procedures for opening safes); United States v. Russo, 250 F. Supp. 55,
58 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (a warrant for specified gambling equipment and paraphernalia will authorize seizure of wrenches and an adjustable iron pipe
which may be used to bar the entrance door to the gambling establishment
named in the warrant, so as to prevent detection and aid escape; the court
felt that such items fell within the classification of criminal instrumentalities having sufficient relation to the purpose of the warrant to permit
seizure thereunder); United States v. Joseph, 174 F. Supp. 539, 545 (E.D.
Pa. 1959), aff'd on other grounds, 278 F.2d 504, 505 (3d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 823 (1960) (money may be seized under a warrant for duly
specified gambling equipment and paraphernalia, as it bears a reasonable
relation to the purpose of the search); but see United States v. Alloway,
397 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1968), where the court, although recognizing that the
general rule permitted lawful seizure only of those items listed in a

contraband, then its seizure will be permitted as the fruits of a
search incidental to an inpresence crime.5

warrant, id. at 110, allowed, as an exception thereto, the seizure of a suit
of clothes as a means or instrumentality of the crime for which the warrant
had been issued. Id. at 110-11. However, since the search had not been
conducted as an incident of a valid arrest, it is difficult to see how the seizure could have been sustained under the criminal-instrumentality-andfruits rule developed in cases such as Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364, 367 (1964); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); and Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). The better approach would have
been to rely exclusively upon the reasonable-relation-to-the-purpose-ofthe-search rule. And, in United States v. Robinson, 287 F. Supp. 245, 254
(N.D. Ind. 1968), the court held that as a reasonable incident to the execution of a valid search warrant, peace officers may seize fruits, instruments, and evidence of any unrelated crime; the theory being that if such
seizure is not sanctioned under the authority of the warrant, but would be
under that of the incidental search, officers would be reluctant to seek
warrants. Id.
Although there is a surface logic to the court's argument in Robinson, it is submitted that its reliance upon the incidental-search rule is
misplaced. The basis for that rule is threefold: to protect the officers'
safety; to discover evidence flowing from the purpose of the arrest; and
to support a second arrest for an in-presence crime. While it cannot be
doubted that the warrant will sanction seizure of nonspecified but closely
related evidence, it will not support the seizure of any evidence of any unrelated crime. However, if the unrelated evidence be contraband, its seizure will be authorized as the fruits of a search incidental to an inpresence crime. If it is not contraband, then it may not be seized under the
authority of either the warrant or of the incidental search. Therefore, the
Court's attempt to sanction the seizure of any evidence of an unrelated
crime under the authority of the warrant is to resuscitate the dreaded
general warrant, a fact which the court apparently recognized when it
conceded that its ruling could not be squared with Marron v. United
States, cited note 51 supra. Id. at 254. This is not to say that its discovery
is illegal. As long as the warrant is executed in such a manner as not to
degenerate into either a general or an exploratory search, the results
thereof may be validly used to obtain a second warrant. In fact, resort
to a second warrant will probably be required even in the case of the
discovery of contraband, where the defendant is not present at the time of
such discovery. If this proves to be an inconvenience to law enforcement
officers, tiis one they can live with-certainly one that will never justify
the infringement of rights protected under the fourth amendment. Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948). Furthermore, it is difficult to see
how faithful adherence to the rule limiting seizure to those items specified
in the warrant, or to those bearing a close relation to the purpose of the
search, will invite indiscriminate resort to the warrantless search. Such
an argument presupposes that peace officers may with impunity burst in
upon the privacy of the individual without regard to the requirements of
reasonableness and probable cause. Finally, it overlooks the rule forbidding warrantless entry into a private dwelling to conduct a search. See
authorities cited note 7 supra.
85. E.g., Seymour v. United States, 369 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967) (officers, while searching for narcotics,
were permitted to seize government property belonging to a particular
post office which they knew had been robbed); Porter v. United States,
335 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 983 (1965) (authorizing seizure of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun); see United States v.
Teller, 397 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1968).
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3. Will a warrant for premises or property permit
a search of a person?
In the execution of search warrants for premises only, it is not
infrequent for the searcher to discover persons either frequenting
or entering the premises during the execution of the warrant. This
poses a problem for the officer: the evidence he is seeking may be
on the person, thereby frustrating the purpose of the search if the
latter is overlooked; but, if the search of the person is attempted to
be justified under the authority of the warrant, it runs the risk of
being invalidated since the person's name may not appear on the
warrant. Because of this potentially inherit conflict of interests,
the courts have formulated a solution that extends to the individual
the security guaranteed under the fourth amendment without unduly hampering effective law enforcement.
The general rule is that a warrant for premises only will not
authorize a search of persons found thereon.8 6 Some courts have
qualified this by forbidding a search only of a person not connected with the premises and not named or referred to in the
supporting affidavit.8 7 Others say that in the absence of probable
86. Carney v. United States, 79 F.2d 821, 822 (6th Cir. 1935); United
States v. Haywood, 284 F. Supp. 245, 250 (E.D. La. 1968); United States v.
McKethan, 247 F. Supp. 324, 326 (D.D.C. 1965), aff'd by order, No. 20,059
(D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Darby, 201 F. Supp. 317, 318 (W.D. Pa.
1962); United States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp. 160, 163 (D. Mass. 1960); United
States v. Diange, 32 F. Supp. 14, 15 (W.D. Pa. 1940); People v. Valdez, 67
Cal. Rptr. 583, 586 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (merely because an individual is
on premises where the police have reason to believe criminal activities are
being committed will not justify either his arrest or a search of his person) ; Salmon v. State, 2 Md. App. 513, 520 n.4, 235 A.2d 758, 762 n.4 (1967);
People v. Smith, 21 N.Y.2d 698, 699, 234 N.E.2d 460, 461, 287 N.Y.S.2d 425,
426 (1967); see United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948) (dictum by
implication); United States v. Sigal, 341 F.2d 837, 841 (3d Cir. 1965) (concurring and dissenting opinion) (by agreement of the parties, items seized
from the persons of defendants were not put in evidence), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965); State v. Romeo, 43 N.J. 188, 205, 203 A.2d 23, 32 (1964)
(dictum), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 970 (1965); State v. Parsons, 83 N.J. Super.
430, 447, 200 A.2d 340, 349 (App. Div. 1964). There is the concomitant rule
permitting a search of premises under the authority of a warrant directed
to the person, where the warrant states that the items sought are, on probable cause, situated on specified premises. Gregory v. United States, 237
F.2d 727, 728 (5th Cir. 1956).
87. E.g., State v. Davino, CR. 4-8487 (Conn. Cir. Ct. Tr. Div. 1964)
(opinion unreported); Purkey v. Maby, 33 Ida. 281, 283, 193 P. 79-80
(1920); State v. Bradbury, 243 A.2d 302, 303 (N.H. 1968). They are not
clear, however, as to what degree of connection and reference will justify a
search. As to the connection that will permit a slight detention to preserve the premises for a search, see State v. Romeo, 43 N.J. 188, 202-205,
203 A.2d 23, 30-32 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 970 (1965).

cause to believe that he has committed a crime, the warrant will
not justify the search of an individual."'
Although the warrant is not a blanket authority to search any
and all persons found upon the premises, this does not mean that
their presence is irrelevant to its execution. Therefore, in executing the warrant, the officer may legitimately require such persons to remain still and to restrict their movement "so as to preserve the premises for the search,"8 9 or until "it [can] be ascertained that [they are] not engaged in removing or secreting property specified in the warrant or involved in the criminal business." 90
Such restriction will not constitute an arrest,91 provided no attempt
is made to search those detained or require them to empty their
92
pockets.
In addition, the distinction between a warrant for premises
and one for the person is sometimes thinly drawn. For example,
it has been held that a search of a pocketbook lying in the center of
a kitchen table constituted a search of the premises and not of the
person. 3 And where the circumstances make it reasonable for the
executing officers to believe that the objects sought on the premises
are in open view and on the individual, the warrant will authorize
a seizure, not accompanied by a search of his person, of objects
held in his hand.9 4
88. See People v. Smith, 21 N.Y.2d 698, 699, 234 N.E.2d 460, 461, 287
N.Y.S.2d 425, 426 (1967). This reasoning is specious. If the searcher has
probable cause to arrest, he may then conduct a reasonable incidental
search without regard to the command of the warrant. E.g., United States
v. Jordan, 349 F.2d 107, 109 (6th Cir. 1965) (recognizing that a premises
search may uncover enough evidence to justify the arrest and incidental
search of the owner or occupant).
89. United States v. McKethan, 247 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D.D.C. 1965),
aff'd by order, No. 20,059 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
90. State v. Romeo, 43 N.J. 188, 205-206, 203 A.2d 23, 32 (1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 970 (1965); accord, United States v. Haywood, 284 F. Supp.
245, 249 (E.D. La. 1968) (their movement may also be restricted to prevent
"the destruction of evidence which the search was intended to reach").
91. United States v. Haywood, 284 F. Supp. 245, 249 (E.D. La. 1968);
United States v. McKethan, 247 F. Supp. 324, 328-29 (D.D.C. 1965), aff'd
by order, No. 20,059 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
92. United States v. Jordan, 284 F. Supp. 758, 760 (D. Mass. 1968).
93. United States v. Riccitelli, 259 F. Supp. 665, 666 (D. Conn. 1966).
The court pointed out that although the owner of the pocketbook was only
a visitor, the pocketbook was not within her physical possession at the
time of the search and she had not been coerced into surrendering it.
Id., accord, United States v. Teller, 397 F.2d 494, 497-98 (7th Cir. 1968)
(a warrant for premises will permit the search of a woman's purse lying
on a bed).
94. E.g., Walker v. United States, 327 F.2d 597, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 956 (1965) (to hold otherwise would mean that a
warrant for premises could be "frustrated by the device of simply picking up the guilty object and holding it in one's hand"); Clay v. United
States, 246 F.2d 298, 300 n.2, 304 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 863
(1957). Both Walker and Clay have been so interpreted. See discussion
in United States v. Haywood, 284 F. Supp. 245, 248 (E.D. La. 1968). But
see United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,

D. Descriptionsfor Premises
1. Is the name of the owner or occupant required?
The better rule would seem to require that a warrant for
premises include the name, if known, of its owner or occupier9 5
thereby forestalling any claim of lack of specificity. But the courts
have not insisted upon this. In warrants for premises, the rule is
that if the warrant describes with particularity the place to be
searched and the items to be seized, it is not required that the name
of the owner or occupier be specified.9 6 The reasons for this rule
have not been authoritatively stated, but they appear to revolve
around the issue of scope and the problem of practicality. First,
the fourth amendment requires specificity of description only for
the place to be searched and the things to be seized. If the warrant
is so drawn and executed that the owner or occupier is not searched,
the amendment will have been satisfied.9 7 Second, to insist upon
the individual's name when it is not known to the officer seeking
the warrant could frustrate the legitimate interests of effective
law enforcement. Ownership might have so recently changed
that the officer is presently unable to locate it in an examination
of property or municipal records. Also, occupancy may have
recently commenced, possibly under an assumed name. In view of
these considerations insistence upon the name of the owner or
occupier could create situations where peace officers would be unable to seize with dispatch the fruits of criminal activities. The net
effect would be to discourage them from seeking warrants, which
is preferred by the Supreme Court. 9s
379 U.S. 839 (1964), where, in sustaining the seizure of a key from defendant's person, the Court cited Clay with approval. It is not clear from
the opinion whether the warrant was directed only to the premises, or
whether the key was uncovered as a result of a search. The supporting
affidavit, however, did refer in some detail to defendant. Id. at 195-96.
95. Brown v. State, 184 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966);
see O'Brien v. State, 158 Tenn. 400, 402, 14 S.W.2d 51 (1929). The same
requirement would apply to motor vehicles. E.g., State v. Edwards, 311
P.2d 266, 270 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957); Hines v. State, 275 P.2d 355, 357
(Okla. Crim. App. 1954).
96. Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 99 (8th Cir. 1968); Miller
v. Sigler, 353 F.2d 424, 428 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 980 (1966);
Dixon v. United States, 211 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1954); Carney v. United
States, 79 F.2d 821, 822 (6th Cir. 1935); United States v. Fitzmaurice, 45
F.2d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 1930); United States v. Diange, 32 F. Supp. 14, 15
(W.D. Pa. 1940); United States v. Bell, 17 F.R.D. 13, 14 (D.D.C. 1955),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Woods v. United States, 240 F.2d 37, 41
(D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 941 (1957); People v. Scott, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 257, 261 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968); State v. Edwards, 311 P.2d 266, 269
(Okla. Crim. App. 1957); 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 81(b)(3), at
892 (1952).
97. Garner v. State, 423 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tenn. 1968) (a "John Doe,"
i.e., a nonexistent person, warrant).
98. See authorities cited note 10 supra.

2.

Multiple dwelling units

An apartment or multiple-dwelling-unit building poses a
peculiar problem for the drafter of search warrants. Each unit
represents a separate residence 99 which may not be invaded without a demonstration of probable cause. Once probable cause has
been established, the warrant must specify the exact unit to be
searched for the intrusion to be sanctioned by probable cause. 100
The rule has been aptly stated:
The basic requirement is that the officers who are commanded to search be able from the 'particular' description
of the search warrant to identify the specific place for
which there is probable cause to believe that a crime is
being committed. This requirement may be satisfied by
giving the address of the building and naming the person
whose apartment is to be searched. 01'
Where probable cause has been shown for searching only one
unit, the general rule is that a warrant for an entire multiple-dwelling-unit building is void. 1 2 The same rule will apply where the
supporting affidavit only shows that criminal activities are taking
place in some unspecified place within the building. 0 3 This rule
is strictly enforced and such a warrant will not be saved by the
fact that only the dwelling unit for which probable cause has been
04
established is actually searched.
99. United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 325-26 (7th Cir. 1955);
State v. Ratushny, 82 N.J. Super. 499, 504-505, 198 A.2d 131, 134 (App. Div.
1964); People v. Rainey, 14 N.Y.2d 35, 37, 197 N.E.2d 527, 529, 248 N.Y.S.2d
33, 36 (1964); Commonwealth v. Copertino, 209 Pa. Super. 63, 68-69, 224
A.2d 228, 230 (1966).
100. United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 326 (7th Cir. 1955); People
v. Rainey, 14 N.Y.2d 35, 37, 197 N.E.2d 527, 529, 248 N.Y.S.2d 33, 37 (1964).
For example, if the warrant describes the unit as consisting of space in
more than one story, when in fact it is situated on only one floor, the
warrant will not authorize a search outside of the actual limits of the
dwelling. Commonwealth v. Lillis, 349 Mass. 422, 425, 209 N.E.2d 186, 188
(1965).
101. United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 326 (7th Cir. 1955). See
Commonwealth v. Fiorini, 202 Pa. Super. 88, 93-94, 195 A.2d 119, 122
(1963).
102. United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 326 (7th Cir. 1955); United
States v. Barkouskas, 38 F.2d 837, 838 (M.D. Pa. 1930); United States v.
Poppitt, 227 F. Supp. 73, 76 (D. Del. 1964); People v. Estrada, 234 Cal. App.
2d 136, 146, 44 Cal. Rptr. 165, 172 (1965); Fance v. State, 207 So. 2d 331,
333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); State v. Ratushny, 82 N.J. Super. 499, 505,
198 A.2d 131, 134 (App. Div. 1964); People v. Rainey, 14 N.Y.2d 35, 37-38,
39, 197 N.E.2d 527, 529, 530, 248 N.Y.S.2d 33, 36, 37 (1964); State v. Costakos,
226 A.2d 695, 697 (R.I. 1967); 2 UNDER-HILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 411, at
125 (5th ed. 1966 supp.).
103. United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 326 (7th Cir. 1955).
104. State v. Ratushny, 82 N.J. Super. 499, 506, 198 A.2d 131, 135
(App. Div. 1964). On the other hand, if the affiant has probable cause to
believe that the entire building should be searched, the warrant will not be
invalidated because subsequent events prove his belief erroneous, provided
the search is actually restricted to that part of the building to which it
should have been directed. United States v. Poppitt, 227 F. Supp. 73, 77
(D. Del. 1964); People v. Hartfield, 237 N.E.2d 193, 196 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
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There are several exceptions to this rule. The outward
appearance of the building may indicate that it is actually a onefamily residence. The warrant will therefore not be invalidated by
the fact that it secretly contains more than one dwelling unit,
provided this is not known to the officer applying for the warrant.10 5 Furthermore, if there is probable cause to believe that all
of the dwelling units are being used for criminal purposes, or that
the entire building is being occupied as a single unit, it is persible for the warrant to contain a general description. 0 6 Finally,
where it may appear from the supporting affidavit that it is not
reasonable for peace officers to know that the premises contain
more than one unit, and they are justified in not inquiring for
fear of alerting a suspect, a more general description will suffice.0 7
E. Erroneous Descriptionsin Search Warrants
We have seen that due to the correlation between probable
cause and specificity, a warrant will fail for generality and lack of
probable cause if it fails to adequately identify the premises or
person to be searched, or the items to be seized. A closely related
rule concerns the warrant that contains an erroneous but otherwise adequately specific description. While the deficiency may
have no bearing on generality, it can affect probable cause; if the
description is fatally inaccurate, it will eliminate probable cause
for the warrant and the ensuing search. This is a question of fact
and must be determined only after all of the circumstances have
been carefully considered. Therefore, this problem can best be
analyzed by considering individual cases, keeping in mind that (1)
a warrant is entrusted to a trained law enforcement officer, "who
is expected to make reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the
place intended and to know how to do it;' 08 and (2) that as long as
the warrant's description is specific enough for the officer to
locate with reasonable certainty the property or person sought, it
will be sufficient.10 9
105. United States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 51, 67 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 834 (1961); United States v. Ramos, 282 F. Supp. 354, 355
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Owens v. Scafati, 273 F. Supp. 428, 429 (D. Mass. 1967),
cert. of probable cause denied (1st Cir. 1967) (opinion unreported), cert.
denied, 88 S. Ct. 2043 (1968).
106. Commonwealth v. Copertino, 209 Pa. Super. 63, 68, 224 A.2d 228,
230 (1966).
107. State v. Ratushny, 82 N.J. Super. 499, 506, 198 A.2d 131, 135
(App. Div. 1964).
108. State v. Ferrara, 98 N.J. Super. 534, 537, 237 A.2d 905, 906 (App.
Div. 1968).
109. O'Brien v. State, 158 Tenn. 400, 402, 14 S.W.2d 51 (1929).

A frequent example of erroneous description involves the
address of premises to be searched. A number of courts have taken
the position that as long as the premises are otherwise adequately
described, the insertion of an erroneous street number will not
invalidate a search warrant. 110 The better approach would be to
evaluate the discrepancy in terms of its effect upon probable cause.
Thus, where the incorrect street address was used throughout the
supporting affidavits, as well as in the warrant, it was held that the
discrepancy would expose innocent premises and persons to a
search without probable cause.111
Another example is where there is a correct listing of the
address but an incorrect designation of the premises, either as the
only one of its kind located at the specified address, or in misstating
its physical location. Here, a reviewing court will consider the
familiarity of the executing officers with the particular location
involved. Where all outward physical appearances indicate a onefamily residence, it may be so designated, even though in fact it
contains multiple dwelling units." 2 Where the warrant specifies
110. United States v. Pisano, 191 F. Supp. 861, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
In Pisano a warrant for "a grocery store known as 'Esta's' located on the
ground floor of a building at 129 West 3rd Street, Mount Vernon, New
York," was sufficient, even though the correct address was 109 West 3rd
Street. The designation of the place to be searched as "Esta's', located on
... West 3rd Street" in Mount Vernon was adequate in itself for the officers to have located the place. Also the officers who executed the warrant
had had the store under surveillance for two weeks prior to the date of
execution. United States v. Joseph, 174 F. Supp. 539, 544 (E.D. Pa. 1959),
aff'd on other grounds, 278 F.2d 504, 505 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 823 (1960) ("No. 209 Court Terrace," instead of the correct address,
"209 Minersville Street," was adequate, as the evidence established that
Court Terrace was but a continuation of Minersville Street); State v.
Daniels, 46 N.J. 428, 437, 217 A.2d 610, 615 (1966) (the court emphasized
that the officers had had the premises under surveillance for some time
prior to obtaining the warrant, and had received information from a reliable informant that illegal lottery operations were being conducted at
"No. 31 Avon Place" [the correct address being "No. 35 Avon Place"].
Moreover, as they were forced to cruise in front of the premises at a fairly
fast pace so as not to arouse suspicions, the officers were able to note only
that the adjacent property was "No. 33"); State v. Ferrara, 98 N.J. Super.
534, 537, 237 A.2d 905, 907 (App. Div. 1968); State v. Medero, 95 N.J. Super.
209, 213-214, 230 A.2d 516, 518 (App. Div. 1967) ("122 East Fourth Street,"
instead of the correct address, "120 East Fourth Street," was adequate since
at one time the premises had been two separate stores [120 and 122]. At
the time of the search they were being operated as one store, access to
which was only through the door at 122); People v. Law, 55 Misc. 2d 1075,
1078, 287 N.Y.S.2d 565, 569 (Cortland Co. 1968) (incorrect town).
111. United States v. Kenny, 164 F. Supp. 891, 893 (D.D.C. 1958) (a
warrant for "2144 - 8th St." will not authorize a search of premises at
"2124 - 8th St."). On the other hand, as long as the premises are otherwise
adequately described, so that the searcher can locate and identify them
with reasonable effort, a variance between the address listed in the affidavit and that specified in the warrant is not fatal. Wangrow v. United
States, 399 F.2d 106, 115 (8th Cir. 1968) (the affidavit alleged the address
to be "208 North LaPorte Street," whereas the warrant described it as "210
North LaPorte Street").
112. E.g., Owens v. Scafati, 273 F. Supp. 428, 429 (D. Mass. 1967), cer-
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the place to be searched as the basement apartment of correctly
addressed premises, this will be adequate, even though the property
contains more than one basement apartment. 13 And, where the
correct address is listed, but surplus descriptive language incorrectly describes its physical relationship to a particular landmark,
4
this also will still be sufficient."
Warrants have also erroneously described individuals. The
issue of validity will again be resolved by determining the effect
this has upon the existence of probable cause. For example, where
a defendant was correctly named but erroneously described in the
supporting affidavit as the lessee of an apartment which was
actually leased to his brother, the warrant was not invalidated for
lack of probable cause." 5 Nor was probable cause lacking where
the warrant incorrectly listed the defendant's first name but her
maiden name was correctly listed, as well as that of her husband,
and her correct address was stated." 6
Although they are treated in greater detail in a later section,
a few words about automobiles and their owners are in order. As
tificate of probable cause denied (1st Cir. 1967) (opinion unreported), cert.
denied, 88 S. Ct. 2043 (1968). Closely allied to this is the situation involving
the multiple-dwelling-unit building where the outward physical appearances indicate a lesser number of units than actually exist. In this event,
a warrant will not be invalidated by its failure to include all of the units.
Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 99 (8th Cir. 1968) (a warrant for
premises designated as '1419 and 1421 North Park, in the City of St. Louis,
Missouri . . . consisting of two family dwelling units' will extend to the
third apartment, number '1419a', even though apartment number '1419' is
actually unoccupied). The Court noted that the numbers '1419' and '1421'
appeared above the two entrances to the building, although the numbers
'1419a' and '1421a' were designated on its front side. Id.
113. E.g., United States v. Gomez, 42 F.R.D. 347, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(since the executing officers had familiarized themselves with the apartment through surveillance, they knew exactly which apartment to search).
The court apparently did not consider that if the officers were so familiar
with the apartment, they could have made an effort to more accurately
describe the one sought. Since the Court noted that the outside appearance
of the building made it impossible prior to execution to know of the existence of the other basement apartments, it is hard to understand how
it could claim that the officers knew exactly where to go.
114. E.g., State v. Lemon, 212 So. 2d 322, 324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
This represents a
1968) (recognizing that the case was "a close one").
good example of the wisdom of putting the owner's or occupier's name in
the warrant.
115. People v. Redd, 76 Ill. App. 2d 431, 221 N.E.2d 774 775 (1966).
Conversely, if the warrant contains an inadequate description but refers
back to the supporting affidavit which contains the required accuracy, the
warrant is valid. People v. Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d 672, 673-674, 279 N.Y.S.2d
836, 837-38 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1967).
116. Weller v. Russell, 321 F.2d 848, 853 (3d Cir. 1963); United States
v. Epstein, 240 F. Supp. 80, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).

long as a warrant adequately describes the automobile it will not be
voided by an inaccurate description of the owner. 117 With respect
to the vehicle itself, it has been held that if a warrant contains the
correct registration number and make, it will be sufficient, even
though the incorrect year and color are also stated." 8
Finally, if a description is erroneously inserted into a warrant,
and the mistake is patently obvious or inadvertent, then it is permissible to overlook it." 9
In summary, it may be said that a partially incorrect description is sufficient if it still permits the executing officer to definitely
20
locate the property or person sought.
F. Representative Examples of Descriptionsin Warrants
It is now appropriate to present examples of warrant descriptions that the courts have passed upon, dividing them into the
categories of sufficiency and insufficiency. An analysis of warrants for persons, automobiles, books, and eavesdropping will be
covered in later sections.
1. Sufficient specificity
a. Gambling Warrants
The following descriptions have been held adequate for gambling prosecutions:
gambling tables, gambling devices, race horse slips, and
gambling paraphernalia; 21' lottery tickets and other gam117. Prater v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 451, 453, 287 S.W. 951 (1926).
118. Bowling v. State, 408 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tenn. 1966) (emphasizing
that the executing officer would concentrate on the correctly stated registration number). Nor will a variance between the registration number
listed in the supporting affidavit and that specified in the warrant prove
fatal, provided the vehicle is described with sufficient particularity for
the searcher to locate and identify it with reasonable effort. Wangrow v.
United States, 399 F.2d 106, 115 (8th Cir. 1968) (the affidavit described the
vehicle as a '1966 Bonneville, 4-door, Illinois license number VT 6106,'
whereas the warrant listed its number as 'BT 6106')."
119. E.g., Bryant v. United States, 252 F.2d 746, 748 (5th Cir. 1958)
(warrant not invalidated by the insertion of "person" for "premises" in
that part of warrant directing officers where or for whom to search).
However, if a statute requires a warrant to state the name of the person
whose affidavit has been taken in support thereof, then failure to do so, or
to accurately do so, whether through oversight or otherwise, will render the
warrant void. United States ex rel. Pugh v. Pate, 401 F.2d 6, 8 (7th Cir.
1968) (search warrant issued on an affidavit signed with a fictitious name);
United States ex rel. Pugh v. Pate, 401 F.2d 6, 8 (7th Cir. 1968)
(search warrant issued on an affidavit signed with a fictitious
name);
King v. United States, 282 F.2d 398, 399-400 (4th Cir. 1960); United States
v. Carignan, 286 F. Supp. 284, 285 (D. Mass. 1967). The reason for this is
that fictitious oaths, for which no one would have to bear responsibility,
could be resorted to establish probable cause. King v. United States, 282
F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960).
120. 2 UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 411, at 1057 (5th ed. 1956).
121. Huckols v. United States, 99 F.2d 353, 355 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom., Floratos v. United States, 305 U.S. 626 (1938).
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bling paraphernalia which will indicate122a numbers operation is being conducted on the premises;
divers records, to wit books, memoranda, tickets, pads,
tablets, and papers recording the receipt of money from
paid out in... the operation of a wagering busiand
ness . . . , such files, desks, tables and receptacles for the
storing of the books, memoranda, tickets, pads, tablets
and papers aforesaid, and divers receptacles in the nature
of envelopes in which there is kept money won by patrons
. . . and divers other tools, instruments, apparatus, United
States currency and records... ;113
bookmaking records, waging paraphernalia, including . . .
bet slips, betting markers, run down sheets, schedule
sheets indicating the lines, adding machines, money, telephones, telephone address listings

.

.

designed and in-

tended for use as the means of committing criminal
offenses in violation of [specified statutes] ;124
bookmaking paraphernalia consisting in part of betting
markers, scratch sheets, racing forms, business machines,
relating to the conduct of bookand other memoranda
25
making activities;
and other gambling
records, papers,
126 horse bets, monies
paraphernalia.
b. Narcotics
127
a quantity of loose heroin;
narcotics consisting of dangerous drugs, heroin and marijuana, together with a128paraphernalia instrumental in the
use of said contraband.
c. Premises
two buildings consisting of a saloon and a combined sandwich 2shoppe
and residence in Kenton County, Kentucky,
9
etc.;1
1 Thomas Park, [in a specified city] ;13o
122. Merritt v. United States, 249 F.2d 19, 20 (6th Cir. 1957).
123. United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617, 629 (7th Cir. 1960), rev'd on
other grounds, 365 U.S. 312, 316 (1961).
124. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 n.4 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd
on other grounds, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
125. People v. Keener, 55 Cal. 2d 714, 718, 361 P.2d 587, 588, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 859, 860 (1961), overruled on other grounds, People v. Butler, 64
Cal. 2d 842, 845, 415 P.2d 819, 821, 52 Cal. Rptr. 4, 6 (1966).
126. State v. Caponigro, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 603, 610-11, 238 A.2d 434, 439
(App. Div.), cert. denied, 155 Conn. 627, 234 A.2d 449 (1967).
127. United States v. Tucker, 262 F. Supp. 305, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
128. People v. Walker, 58 Cal. Rptr. 495, 496 n.1, 499 (Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
129. Carney v. United States, 79 F.2d 821, 822 (6th Cir. 1935) (the court
did not elaborate further on the "etc.," other than to intimate that the sup-

porting affidavit probably included a reference to the "shoppe" as being

the sign "Green Top Sandwich Shoppe").
130. Owens v. Scafati, 273 F. Supp. 428, 429 (D. Mass. 1967), certificate

the premises known as 130 W. 74th St., Basement Apt.,
New York, N.Y.; 13 1
707 Lore Avenue, being a white, two-story, stucco and
shingled detached house with a glassed enclosed porch on
the west side facing Lighthouse Road, situated on the
northeast corner of Lighthouse Road and Lore
132 Avenue,
Gordon Heights, New Castle County, Delaware;
a grocery store known as 'Esta's,' located on the ground
floor of a building
at 129 West 3rd Street, Mount Vernon,
133
New York;
the premises known as the dwelling of Armand A. Brochu
located at 20 Forest Street, in the City/Town of Biddleford,
County of York and State of Maine, said
premises being
34
owned/occupied by Armand A. Brochu;
Room No. 1 and Room No. 2 of 20083 East Pratt Street
S.. a two-story brick apartment house; 5
the apartment numbered
106 Pleasant St. Cambridge [oc13 6
cupied by] Louis Nikas;
Mederos Grocery, 122 East 4th St., Lakewood, N.J. and
more particularly described as follows: the first floor,
the second floor and cellar of a two-story building on the
South side of East 4th St., Lakewood, N.J.13 7immediately adjacent to and on the East Side of 121 Club;
the shoe shine parlor at 298 West 138th Street, New York,
s
N.Y. 8s
d. Miscellaneous
cases of whiskey;3 9
of probable cause denied (1st Cir. 1967) (opinion unreported), cert. denied,
88 S. Ct. 2043 (1968); accord, Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503
(1925) (a warrant describing the building by one of its two street numbers
is sufficient, even though it is a multi-storied structure with three
street entrances, where the facts showed that the entire building was
under lease to the defendant and he used it for one unified business venture
as a garage and storage area); State v. Lemon, 212 So. 2d 322, 324 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1968); State v. Daniels, 46 N.J. 428, 436-439, 217 A.2d 610,
614, 615 (1966).
131. United States v. Gomez, 42 F.R.D. 347, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
132. United States v. Poppitt, 227 F. Supp. 73, 76 (D. Del 1964)
133 United States v. Pisano, 191 F. Supp. 861, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
134. State v. Brochu, 237 A.2d 418, 422-24 (Me. 1967). This description demonstrates the preferability of including the name of the owneroccupier.
135. Frey v. State, 3 Md. App. 38, 46, 237 A.2d 774, 780 (1968).
136. Commonwealth v. Lillis, 349 Mass. 422, 424, 209 N.E.2d 186, 188
(1965).
137. State v. Medero, 95 N.J. Super. 209, 213, 230 A.2d 516, 518 (App.
Div. 1967).
138. People v. Brown, 40 Misc. 2d 35, 41, 242 N.Y.S.2d 555, 562 (N.Y.
City Crim. Ct. 1963).
139. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 504 (1925). Since, then, it is
not necessary to list the types of whisky sought, or their individual
brands, it is not required in a warrant for moneys to state their serial
numbers. Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 98-99 (8th Cir. 1968). Nor
is it necessary to list the titles of movie films, the term 'stag film' being
sufficient. United States v. Santiago, 289 F. Supp. 893, 895 (D.P.R. 1968).

Specificity Requirements for Warrants
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

140

illegal deer meat and/or elk meat;
weapon or weapons used in the crime of murder, bloodinstruments or parapherstained clothes or rags and other
14
nalia used in crime of murder. '
2.

Insufficient specificity

Where a property warrant lists only the name of the owner,
without giving any description at all of the premises, it will be
fatally deficient. 142 And a warrant for "proceeds of various
143
larcenies and burglaries" is similarly defective.
G. Automobiles and Their Owners
The fact that an automobile is a movable vehicle will have no
bearing upon the degree of specificity required in a warrant for
the same. Thus, as in other types of property warrants, an automobile must be described with enough particularity for the officer
to locate it with reasonable certainty. For this reason, it is not
44
necessary, although preferable, to name or identify the owner.
Therefore, if the warrant inaccurately describes, or does not
specify, the owner but the warrant is otherwise adequately
specific, it will not be invalidated provided the search is limited to
14
the vehicle itself. 5
Annual styling changes and its adaptability to change of color
may make the specificity required for an automobile difficult.
Styling changes in particular may be very subtle and minor for
some automobile years. In view of this, some courts have required
only that the registration number and make be specified. 14 One
140. Dunn v. Municipal Court, 220 Cal. App. 2d 858, 868, 34 Cal. Rptr.
251, 258 (1963).
141. State v. Seefeldt, 51 N.J. 472, , 242 A.2d 322, 331 (1968).
142. Thompson v. State, 206 So. 2d 195, 197 (Miss. 1968).
143. People v. Hendricks, 45 Misc. 2d 7, 9-10, 256 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81
(Sup. Ct. 1965). So, too, is one for narcotics, "paraphernalia which could
be used to violate [specified statutes]." State v. Taylor, 28 Conn. Supp.
19, 23, 246 A.2d 898, 900-01 (Super. Ct. 1968).
144. E.g., Wangrow v. United States, 399 F.2d 106, 115 (8th Cir. 1968);
State v. Edwards, 311 P.2d 266, 270 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957); Hines v. State,
275 P.2d 355, 357 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954). This is especially so where the
officer seeking the warrant does not know the name or identity of the
owner. Id.
145. Clenny v. State, 43 Ala. App. 622, 625-626, 198 So. 2d 289, 293
(1966); Prater v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 451, 453, 287 S.W. 951 (1926)
(involving a "John Doe" warrant).
146. Id.; Bowling v. State, 408 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tenn. 1966) (em-

phasizing that the searcher would concentrate on the registration num-

ber).

court has even held that only the registration number is required. 147 It is submitted that since registration plates may be
easily removed or substituted, more should be required than a
simple listing of their numbers; and this has been required by at
1 48

least one court.

Finally, the scope of an adequately specific warrant for an
automobile will extend to all of its component parts, and will include dust, scratches, dents, stains, and mud. 14 It will not extend,
however, to baggage or cargo. 1 0
H. Books and Other Printed Materials
There is a long history of abuse involving the use of the power
of search and seizure to suppress and censor objectionable publications. 16 Therefore, the constitutional requirement of specificity
in search warrants is "to be accorded the most scrupulous
exactitude when the 'things' are books, and the basis for their
seizure is the ideas which they contain.'' 2 To implement this
15 3
broadly stated policy and to avoid a system of prior censorship,
to decide on his
a law enforcement officer will not be permitted
54
own what printed matter is subject to seizure.
Before printed materials may be legitimately seized, a determination of subjection must always be made by an impartial magistrate.6 5 He should then draft a warrant particularly and in147. Hines v. State, 275 P.2d 355, 356 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954).
148. E.g., State v. Allen, 155 Conn. 385, 391-92, 232 A.2d 315, 319
(1967).
149. State v. Darwin, 155 Conn. 124, 145, 230 A.2d 573, 584 (1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 88 S. Ct. 1488, 1490 (1968). As to scope, the better
procedure would be for peace officers to apply simultaneously for two warrants to search two separate vehicles, at least where each is owned by a
different person. In this way there can be no valid claim that they are
engaging in a general search. See Porter v. United States, 335 F.2d 602,
605 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 983 (1965).
150. State v. Darwin, 155 Conn. 124, 145-46, 230 A.2d 573, 584 (1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 88 S. Ct. 1488, 1490 (1968).
151. For an excellent survey of this abuse, see the extended discussion
in Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, etc., 367 U.S. 717, 724-29 (1961);
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 20-24, 28-29 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
LANDYSNKI].
152. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (emphasis added);
accord, Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 346 Mass. 300, 307, 191 N.E.2d 873, 878
n.11 (1963); People v. Kozak, 56 Misc. 2d 337, 343, 288 N.Y.S.2d 692, 695
(N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1968).
153. For a history of the abuses involving this system, see LANDYNSKI,
supra note 151, at 21-24, 28-29.
154. Metzger v. Pearcy, 393 F.2d 202, 204 (7th Cir. 1968); People v.
Bosco, 290 N.Y.S.2d 481, 485 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1968) (in searching for
written matter, police officers are not permitted, as they are in narcotics
and gambling warrants, "the usual and albeit lawful meanderings outside
the warrant").
155. Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 732-33, 73637 (1961); see A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205,
208, 210-11 (1964); Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1963).
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telligently describing each item by title, content, subject matter,
and inherent characteristics of each. 5 ' For example, a warrant
for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda,
... and other written instruments concerning the Communist
Party of Texas, and the operations of the Communist Party in
Texas," is indiscriminate in sweep, and therefore "constitutionally
intolerable."1' 7 In short, it is general.5 8 So, too, is a warrant for
"indecent books and material."'159 And a warrant for "obscene,
indecent and 'hard core pornographic' pictures, photographs and
motion picture films," will be deemed too broad. 1 0
I. Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping, which is "the generic term encompassing wiretapping and bugging,"''1 is by its very nature secretive and sur12
reptitious, and was condemned at the common law as a nuisance.
In view of this, it has been recognized as a grave threat to human
liberty. 163 Yet, it was not until recently that eavesdropping was
classified as a search within the purview of the fourth amendment.
When the Supreme Court first came to grips with the problem
posed by wiretapping in Olmstead v. United States,6 4 it held that
conversations overheard by means which did not involve a physical
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area were not within
the amendment's protection. This interpretation, however, was
effectively emasculated in Berger v. New York. 16 5 There the Court
156. Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 346 Mass. 300, 306, 191 N.E.2d 873,
878 n.11 (1963).
157. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 486 (1965).
158. Id. at 480.
159. People v. Matherson, 16 N.Y.2d 509, 510, 208 N.E.2d 180, 260 N.Y.S.
2d 448, 449 (1965). Although the language used in the warrant does not
appear in the Court's memorandum decision, it does appear in People v.
Rothenberg, 20 N.Y.2d 35, 38, 228 N.E.2d 379, 380, 281 N.Y.S.2d 316, 317
(1967), which discusses Matherson.
160. People v. Rothenberg, 20 N.Y.2d 35, 38, 228 N.E.2d 379, 380, 281
N.Y.S.2d 316, 317 (1967).
161. People v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86, 106, 233 N.E.2d 818, 830, 286 N.Y.S.
2d 801, 818 (1967) (dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Fuld), cert. granted,
88 S. Ct. 1436 (1968); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1967),
where the Court discussed their historical development and treated wiretapping and bugging as types of eavesdropping.
162. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967); LANDYNSKI, supra
note 151, at 198.
163. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967).
164. 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928).
165. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). But see People v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86, 100-01,
233 N.E.2d 818, 826-27, 286 N.Y.S.2d 801, 813 (1967), cert. granted, 88 S. Ct.
1436 (1968), where the Court took the position that the trespass doctrine
survived Berger, thereby limiting the holding in Berger to trespassory intrusions accomplished under the authority of a general warrant.

ruled that the use of electronic devices to capture conversations is
a "search" for fourth-amendment purposes. 168 Finally, in Katz v.
United States,16 the Court specifically rejected the trespass doctrine announced in Olmstead and held that electronic eavesdropping, accomplished without physical penetration, constituted a
168
search and seizure under the amendment.
Since eavesdropping is now considered a search, the question
has arisen as to the feasibility of drafting an eavesdropping warrant that will satisfy the specificity requirements of the fourth
amendment; 10 9 and the reasons for this are readily apparent. First,
it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to state in advance
the particular conversations or verbal statements that are sought.
Second, an eavesdrop, since it is necessarily indiscriminate, will
pick up all conversations, regardless of their nature. Thus, it will
invade private and social conversations of a noncriminal nature.
Third, because of the correlation between probable cause and
specificity, a warrant to eavesdrop will have to be severely limited in time. Otherwise, there will result a series of intrusions on
the basis of a single showing of probable cause, and the indiscriminate seizure of any and all conversations without regard to their
170
relevance to the crime under investigation.
166. 388 U.S. at 51. This result had been foreshadowed in Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963),

where the Court observed that the

amendment "may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as
well as against the more traditional seizure of 'papers and effects.'"
Id. at 485.
167. 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967).
168. Id. at 512. In support of its basic decision, the Court emphasized
the general rule that warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment," a rule which is "subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions." Id. at 514 (emphasis in
original). That Katz has "definitely overruled" Olmstead cannot be
doubted. Hanna v. United States, 393 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding
that section 605 of the Federal Communications Act (48 Stat. 1064, 1103,
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934) ) may not authorize a violation of the amendment
as now interpreted by Katz). The fruits of a wiretap obtained in violation
of the Act are now inadmissible in all courts. Lee v. Florida, 8 S. Ct. 2096,
Concerning the continued vitality of the physical2098, 2101 (1968).
intrusion-into-a-constitutionally-protected-area rule, it should be noted
that while Katz does not require a physical intrusion before warrantless
search activity may be classified as unreasonable, this does not mean that
such intrusion is wholly irrelevant. For example, if a police officer witnesses a crime being committed or obtains probable-cause knowledge
only after a warrantless intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, the
resulting arrest and search will be illegal. Brown v. State, 3 Md. App. 90,
93, 238 A.2d 147, 149 (1968). The court construed Katz as not overruling
the physical-intrusion rule. Id. at 95, 238 A.2d 150 n.3. It would seem,
therefore, that Katz will never sanction any intrusion without benefit of
probable cause.
169. People v. Grossman, 45 Misc. 2d 557, 566-568, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266,
276-77 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (dictum); see Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41,
113 (1967) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White).
170. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56, 57, 59 (1967) (invalidating a
statute that authorized eavesdropping for a two-month period); People v.
Grossman, 45 Misc. 2d 557, 568, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266, 276-77 (Sup. Ct. 1965).

Specificity Requirements for Warrants
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

In spite of these obvious shortcomings, the Supreme Court is
not prepared to say that an eavesdrop warrant cannot be constitutionally devised.' 7 ' The Court will sanction a warrant for
electronic search where: the commission of a specific offense is
alleged; the existence of probable cause has been established; the
conversations sought, and their authors, are described with particularity; its use is employed under extremely precise and limited
circumstances; and its authorization is carefully circumscribed, as
to time, place and manner of execution, so as to prevent unauthorized general invasions of privacy. 172 In short, eavesdropping may
be undertaken only under "strict judicial supervision and subject
to the severest constitutional restraints."' 78 As to example of such
strictness, it has been observed that a warrant for "any and all
conversations, communications and discussions," is general. 7 4 To
hold otherwise would be to give the executing officer "a roving
commission to 'seize' any and all conversations.' 1 75 And, while
an eavesdrop statute may require the naming of the person or
persons whose conversations are to be overheard or recorded in
order to comply with the requirement of specificity as to person,
this will not save it from judicial nullification if it does not also
17
require a particular description of the conversations to be seized.
171. E.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 464 (1963) (dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan).
172. E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 512-13 (1967) (dictum);
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-59, 63 (1967); Osborn v. United States,
385 U.S. 323, 329-31 (1966); see People v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86, 103, 233
N.E.2d 818, 828, 286 N.Y.S.2d 801, 815 (1967), cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 1436
(1968).
Also, a single limited intrusion is to be preferred to one for continuous or a series of intrusions. See discussion in Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967).
173. People v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86, 97, 233 N.E.2d 818, 824, 286 N.Y.S.2d
801, 809 n.2 (1967) (emphasis added), cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 1436 (1968).
174. People v. Grossman, 45 Misc. 2d 557, 568, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266, 277
(Sup. Ct. 1965) (dictum). Nor may a statute authorize such a warrant.
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55-56, 58-59 (1967).
175. Id. at 59.
176. Id. In people v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86, 233 N.E.2d 818, 286 N.Y.S.
2d 801 (1967), cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 1436 (1968), the court interpreted
Berger as applying prospectively only to bugging, and not to wiretap, warrants executed by means of a physical intrusion. Id. at 98, 99, 233 N.E.2d
at 825, 826, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 811, 812. It may be noted, however, that
Kaiser was decided 11 days prior to Katz. Furthermore, in a strongly
worded dissent, Chief Judge Fuld rejected the argument that the legislative scheme passed upon in Berger could be judicially rehabilitated, as the
supreme court had declared the entire scheme unconstitutional. Eavesdropping was thereby invalidated, whether accomplished by bugging or
wiretapping, under the then existing statutes. The thrust of Berger was
against "the impermissible intrusion into the privacy of conversations, not
merely an unlawful physical entry." Id. at 105, 233 N.E.2d at 829, 286

1. Recent statutory enactments177
In order to comply with the stringent requirements of the
fourth amendment, eavesdropping legislation must lay down
"'precise and discriminate' requirements.' 178 Two recently enacted statutory schemes have attempted to comply with this mandate.
a. The New York Legislation
The New York legislation requires a warrant to contain both a
"particular description of the person and the place, premises or
telephone or telegraph line upon which eavesdropping. . . has been
approved,"'17 9 and a "particular description of the type of the conversation to be obtained by eavesdropping . . . including a statement of the crime to which it relates.' 80 The warrant "must be
executed as soon as practicable," and "[u] pon termination of the
authorization in the warrant or any renewals thereof, eavesdropping must cease and any device installed for the purpose of the
eavesdropping must be removed or permanently inactivated as soon
as practicable."'' 1 Although the "effective period of the warrant
must not exceed twenty days,"'18 2 a renewal period for an additional
twenty (20) days is authorized, upon an additional showing of probable cause therefor. 85 A return within fourteen days after termination of the warrant is required, but this may consist of only a
sworn written summarization of the conversations overheard or
recorded by either the person who applied for the warrant or the
person particularly designated by him to conduct the surveillance,
N.Y.S.2d at 817 (dissenting opinion). Judge Fuld pointed out that this was
a "strictly legislative function," id. at 110, 233 N.E.2d at 833, 286 N.Y.S.2d
at 821 (dissenting opinion), and argued that any evidence obtained through
wiretapping under the then existing scheme would be violative of section
605 of the Federal Communications Act (48 Stat. 1064, 1103, 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1934) ). Id. at 110, 233 N.E.2d at 833, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 821 (dissenting
opinion). Finally, since the New York legislature has drafted new eavesdropping legislation in an attempt to conform to the mandate of Berger,
and since the Congress has seen fit to amend section 605 by exempting
from its ban wiretapping conducted pursuant to the provisions of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Pub. Law 90-351
§ 803, 82 Stat. 197, 223 (June 19, 1968) ), it would appear that Judge Fuld
was correct in his observations.
177. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in any great detail the diverse ramifications of legislation pertaining to eavesdropping.
The discussion will be limited, therefore, to certain general observations,
with passing reference to the most pertinent aspects of some recently
enacted statutes.
178. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967); accord, People v.
Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86, 109, 233 N.E.2d 818, 832, 286 N.Y.S.2d 801, 821 (1967)
(dissenting opinion), cert. granted,88 S. Ct. 1436 (1968).
179, N.Y. CODE CrIM. PROC. § 820(4) (1968).
180. Id. § 820(5).
181. Id. § 822(2).
182. Id. § 820(2).
183. Id. § 821(2).
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and a statement that the eavesdropping device has been removed
84
or permanently inactivated.
The supporting affidavit "shall include a particular description
of the place or premises where the conversation will occur or has
occurred or a particular description of the telephone or telegraph
'1 5
lines over which the conversation will occur or has occurred,
and a "particular description of the type of the conversation sought
to be or which was overheard."1 80 It must also allege facts
"establishing reasonable cause to believe that the conversation of a
particularly described person will constitute evidence of the particularly described crime that has been, is being or is about to be
committed or that the conversation will aid in the apprehension
of the perpetrator of such crime .... ,,"-I
In addition, the affidavit
must state the period of time for which the surveillance is sought,
detailing, where practicable, the "hours of the day or night during
which the conversation may be probably expected to occur."' ' If
the affiant seeks authority to continue the eavesdrop after the
anticipated conversation has been overheard, he must "specifically state facts establishing reasonable cause to believe that additional conversations of the same type will occur subsequently."'8 8
In Berger v. New York, 8 0 the United States Supreme Court
criticized the then existing statute for failure to require a showing
of exigent circumstances before uncontested entry would be
sanctioned, and for having no requirement of notice as do conventional warrants. 191 An attempt has been made in the new scheme
1 2
to remedy these deficiencies.
Finally, provision is made for an application seeking "as soon
as practicable" retroactive approval for the overhearing of an unrelated type of conversation not sought for seizure in the original
application. 0 3
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. § 823(3).

189.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§
§
§
§

817(2)(b).
817(2)(c).
817(2)(b).
817(2)(e).

190. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
191. Id. at 60.
192. E.g., N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. §§ 814(4), 816, 817(2) (d), 823(2)
(exigent circumstances); id. § 823 (1) (notice).
193. Id. §§ 817(2)(g), 818(1),(2). The theory here is probably that
since the original entry is legal, anything illegal uncovered during the
initial authorized search may also be seized as an "incident" of the
initial entry. An alternative theory may be that since a peace officer is
permitted to arrest for a crime he witnesses after having gained lawful
entry, he should be permitted to seize evidence of crime he hears after

Aside from the questionable constitutionality of the provision
authorizing the seizure of an unrelated type of conversation, the
most noticeable deficiency in this statutory scheme' 94 is the authorization for an uninterrupted series of intrusions, searches, and
seizures stretching over a forty-day period supported by only two
showings of probable cause. Although it may be true that it is almost impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy how long it
will take to overhear a particular conversation, and however desirable this may be to provide for effective law enforcement techniques, it must be remembered that the Supreme Court "cannot forget the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in the name of law
enforcement." ' 15 Therefore, it would seem that under the pronouncements of Berger, 196 this extended time period, authorized by
only two showings of probable cause, and involving the potential
seizure of numerous unrelated conversations, is constitutionally deficient. It represents, in short, a misreading of the correlation between probable cause and specificity.
b. The Federal Legislation
The recently enacted Federal legislation19 7 requires the supporting affidavit to contain, inter alia, "(i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed,
(ii) a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be
intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if
known, committing the offense and whose communications are to
be intercepted;" a full statement of the exigent circumstances
justifying an eavesdrop order; and a statement of the period of
time for which the surveillance will be required.198
Provision is made for the surveillance to continue by court
order after the described communication has been obtained, provided the affidavit contains factual assertions "establishing probgaining such entry. See authorities collected in Mascolo, The Role Of
Functional Observation In The Law Of Search And Seizure: A StudV In
Misconception, 71 Dick. L. Rev. 379, 417 n.176 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Mascolo]. However, this provision may prove to be unconstitutional, as it
certainly cannot be sustained as a search incident to a valid arrest, nor
can it be justified as a seizure of evidence of a related crime. See discussion in People v. Grossman, 45 Misc. 2d 557, 569, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266, 278
(Sup. Ct. 1965), where this defect was clearly forewarned, and the implications of the foregoing arguments were rejected.
194. It is even more pronounced in the Federal legislation discussed
infra.
195. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62 (1967).
196. Id. at 59.
197. Enacted as part of the "Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968" (Pub. Law 90-351), 82 Stat. 197 et seq. (90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
June 19, 1968).
198. 82 Stat. 218, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b),(c),(d).
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able cause to believe that additional communications of the same
type will occur thereafter."'19
The order or warrant authorizing the interception must
specify:
the identity of the person, if known, whose communications
are to be intercepted;
the nature and location of the communications facilities
as to which, or the place where, authority to intercept is
granted;
a particular description of the type of communication
sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular
offense to which it relates; . . . and
the period of time during which such interception is authorized, including a statement as to whether or not the
interception shall automatically terminate when
the de200
scribed communication has been first obtained.
Although the statutory scheme provides that the surveillance
shall not be longer than thirty (30) days, a thirty-day extension,
upon an additional showing of probable cause, is permitted. 2 1
Also, emergency taps or surveillance are sanctioned, provided there
exist grounds upon which a court order could be entered, provided
that an application therefor is made within forty-eight (48) hours
after the interception begins or has occurred. In the absence of
such an order, the interception shall cease as soon as the communication sought has been obtained or when the application has been
denied, whichever occurs first. If the application is denied, or if
the interception is terminated without the issuance of an order, the
results of such surveillance may not be used thereafter in any
2 02
prosecution.
If during a court-ordered surveillance, any communication is
intercepted which relates to an offense other than that specified in
the order, it may be properly seized. Upon subsequent application
to and approval by a federal judge, it may be used in evidence. 203
Where possible, the interceptions should be recorded in a way
that will prevent editing or other alterations. The recording,
immediately upon the termination of the order, shall be turned
over to the judge issuing the order and sealed under his directions.
He shall also determine its custody; it may not be destroyed less
204
than ten (10) years after the judge assumes custody.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

82
82
82
82
82
82

Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.

218,
219,
219,
220,
218,
220,

18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (d).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(a),(b),(c),(e).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
216, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518 (7), 2515.
18 U.S.C. § 2517(5).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (a).

A notice of entry, along with an inventory showing the date
of entry, must be served on the person affected by the application
and order no later than ninety (90) days after the application has
205
been filed.
The application, order, and intercepted communications may
be inspected by the person affected on motion to the issuing judge,
who will determine which portions shall be made available. 20 6
Furthermore, the contents of the communication may not be received in evidence unless the person affected has been furnished
a copy of the application and order at least ten (10) days prior to
20 7
trial.
Finally, provision is made to suppress, 20 8 and for the Federal
Government to appeal either from an order granting suppression
20 9
or from a denial of an application to intercept.
c.

Some Comments on Eavesdropping Warrants

Aside from the obvious vice inherent in the provision for an
uninterrupted surveillance for a period of sixty (60) days on the
basis of only two showings of probable cause, 210 neither the federal
nor the New York statutory scheme supplies any protection against
the "seizure" of innocent communications.2 11 As to these, provision for the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of
either will supply no adequate protection. Under even the most
rigorously specific court-ordered eavesdrop, there will thus be an
212
unjustified invasion of the sanctity of private verbal discourse.
The Supreme Court may be willing to pay this price for the
continued use of a claimed effective law enforcement tool, subject
primarily to use for reasonably short periods of time.
III.
A.

ARREST WARRANTS

Introductory Comments

Since the fourth amendment applies to both search and arrest
214
warrants, 21 the same high standard of specificity is required
205. 82 Stat. 220-21, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (d).
206.
207.

82 Stat. 221, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (d).
82 Stat. 221, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9). Under certain conditions, the

issuing judge is permitted to waive this ten-day period. Id.

208. 82 Stat. 221, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (a).
209. 82 Stat. 221, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10(b).
210. In Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), the Court struck
down a two-month surveillance supported only by a single showing of
probable cause. Id. at 59.
211. In fact, this very defect was one of the reasons why the statutory
scheme in Berger was struck down. Id. at 59.
212. People v. Grossman, 45 Misc. 2d 557, 567-568, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266,
276-77 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (dictum).

213.

214.

E.g., Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958).

See People v. Staes, 235 N.E.2d 882, 885 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (a

search warrant for a person must be as specific and accurate as one for
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before an arrest warrant may properly authorize "the apprehension
or detention of the person of another in order that he may be
forth-coming to answer for an alleged crime." 215 As with a search
warrant, an arrest warrant may not issue without probable
216
cause.
In executing an arrest warrant, the officer has no authority to
correct, modify, or alter the same; to do so, after it has been
judicially issued, will render the warrant void.217 The authority
conferred by the warrant will not authorize the arresting officer
at will through the
to conduct a general search or to rummage
218
subject's papers and personal belongings.
Although the Supreme Court prefers arrests to be made under
the authority of warrants, 219 this will not sanction resorting to
them as a pretext for conducting either general or exploratory
220
searches.
Finally, even though the warrant is illegal, a valid warrantless
provided probable cause for the
arrest may still be effectuated,
22
same is lawfully obtained. '
B.

ProbableCause, Scope of Execution, and Specificity

The relationship between probable cause, scope of execution,
and specificity in arrest warrants is twofold. First, the warrant
must be based upon legally obtained evidence establishing that the
person specified has committed the crime for which he is being
arrested. Second, the scope of execution must in turn be based
upon probable cause to believe that the person to be apprehended
will be located where the officer seeks him. 222 For example, an
premises). In view of this, there can be little doubt but that the same
degree of care will be insisted upon for a warrant authorizing the seizure
of an individual.
215. Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 243 A.2d 176, 177 (Pa. Super. 1968)
(defining an "arrest"); for further discussion of the meaning of arrest, see
Mascolo, supra note 193, at 390-91.
216. Government of Virgin Islands v. Rijos, 285 F. Supp. 126, 132
(D.V.I. 1968). The same indispensable element applies to a warrantless
arrest. E.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963); Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102, 104 (1959); Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S. 449, 456 (1957).
217. 1 VARON, supra note 39, at 178 (1961).
218. United States v. Garcia-Sarquiz, 282 F. Supp. 593, 596 (E.D.N.Y.
1968); People v. Cox, 69 Cal. Rptr. 410, 413 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
219. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963).
220. People v. Cox, 69 Cal. Rptr. 410, 413 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968); see
United States v. Retolaza, 398 F.2d 235, 238 (4th Cir. 1968) (dictum).
221. Russo v. United States, 391 F.2d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir. 1968).
222. E.g., United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1967)

arrest warrant which identifies the subject on the basis of evidence
obtained through an illegal search and seizure is void. 223 If the
person sought is located on premises for which there was no prob224
able cause to believe his presence, then his seizure will be illegal.
Although the warrant will authorize a probable cause invasion
of premises owned or occupied by a third person, the resulting
search will be limited to the subject of the warrant. It will not
permit a seizure of any physical evidence not in his immediate con2 25
Therefore, in determining the existence of probable cause
trol.
to believe his presence thereon, a reviewing court will not consider
their search
any items of evidence found by the authorities during
226
of the premises for the person to be apprehended.
C.

Specificity Requirements

To be valid, an arrest warrant "must specifically name or
describe the person to be arrested.1227 Otherwise, it will be void
(in executing an arrest warrant, law enforcement officers may conduct a
warrantless search for the subject on premises of a third person, provided
they reasonably believe he will be found there; the theory being that "the
issuance of an arrest warrant is itself an exceptional circumstance obviating the need for a search warrant"); see United States v. Retolaza, 398
F.2d 235, 238 (4th Cir. 1968) (peace officers may properly enter the residence
of the person for whom they have an arrest warrant to verify the contention of his wife that he is not present). It would appear from the tenor of
the court's opinion that its decision would have been the same if the residence had belonged solely to the subject's wife. In the analogous situation
involving a search warrant for a person, it has been observed that the warrant, to be insulated from an attack of generality, "should specifically limit
the area in which the person is to be searched." People v. Brown, 40
Misc. 2d 35, 41, 242 N.Y.S.2d 555, 562 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1963). Thus, a
search warrant "cannot give abstraction as to place in order to allow a
search of an individual anywhere." Id. at 41, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 562. This
rule pertaining to the scope of execution is not to be confused with the
situation where the executing officer enters the subject's premises and arrests without warrant a stranger to the process on the basis of probable
cause for an in-presence crime. E.g., Defino Martone v. United States,
396 F.2d 229, 231 (1st Cir. 1968). But such entry must be justified under
the warrant's authority. Therefore, if it is made in execution of an illegal
warrant, the officer will not be permitted to justify the arrest on the
basis of what he thereafter observed or discovered. See Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 500 (1958).
223. United States v. Constantino, 201 F. Supp. 160, 161 (W.D. Pa.
1962) (discharging defendant from custody and quashing indictment).
224. United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 263 n.3 (6th Cir. 1967).
This will result in the trial suppression of the fact of such apprehension.
On the other hand, if there was probable cause, then the fact of his presence will be received in evidence. Id. at 264.
225. See id. at 263 n.l.
226. Id. at 263. This is but an application of the rule that a search is
good or bad when it starts and will not be legalized by what it discovers.
E.g., United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948); Commonwealth v.
Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 68, 190 A.2d 304, 310-11, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 910
(1963).
227. West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 86 (1894); accord, Winters v. Campbell, 148 W. Va. 710, 716, 137 S.E.2d 188, 192 (1964); see State v. Furr, 162
S.E.2d 166, 167 (N.C. Ct. App. 1968) (it cannot be said that a search warrant
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for generality.228 The information in the warrant must be sufficient to permit identification with reasonable certainty. 229 It may
include the subject's occupation, his general appearance, physical
peculiarities, his place of residence, and any other pertinent descriptive knowledge. 2 0 If his name is unknown, "some other
means reasonable to the circumstances must be used to assist in
the identification of the subject of the warrant." 21
Since the question of adequate specificity is subject to a factual
determination, a further analysis of specificity requirements for
arrest warrants can best be served on a case-by-case basis.
In West v. Cabel, 232 the Supreme Court held that a warrant
for one "James West," and not otherwise designating or describing
him, would not authorize an arrest of one "Vandy M. West," who
had never been known or called by any other name. This is true
even though it had been the intention of the issuing magistrate
that the person intended for arrest was in fact Vandy M. West.2 3
A "John Doe alias Bud Ferguson" warrant, without any further
description, for one never known by this alias is insufficient, regardless of the knowledge or intent of the arresting officer.23 4 The
"subjective knowledge or intention of the executing officer lends
no support to the warrant and . . . its validity must be tested from
the identifying information on its face." 2 5 A bare "John Doe" or
for premises, in which the owner's correct name is specified, and which is
served upon him, has been served upon an unidentified person). Contrast
this requirement of specificity with the situation involving the warrantless
arrest, where the indispensable element of probable cause can be satisfied
without the prerequisite of knowledge on the part of the arresting officer
of the identity of the person being apprehended. E.g., United States v.
Llanes, 398 F.2d 880, 883 (2d Cir. 1968).
228. West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 86, 87 (1894). Furthermore, any
statute permitting otherwise will be in conflict with the specificity requirements of the fourth amendment. Id. at 87.
229. Winters v. Campbell, 148 W. Va. 710, 716, 137 S.E.2d 188, 192 (1964).
230. People v. Montoya, 63 Cal. Rptr. 73, 77 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967),
cert. denied, 88 S.Ct. 1255 (1968).
231. United States v. Swanner, 237 F. Supp. 69, 71 (E.D. Tenn. 1964).
232. 153 U.S. 78 (1894).
233. Id. at 86-88; accord, Carson v. Doggett, 231 N.C. 629, 635, 58 S.E.2d
609, 614 (1950); Bean v. Best, 77 S.D. 433, 439, 93 N.W.2d 403, 406-07 (1958)
(one "Zelda Bean" may not be arrested under a warrant for "Helen Baker,"
where she had never used such a name or alias and had not knowingly
caused the authorities or the complaining witness to believe that she
was so known).
234. United States v. Swanner, 237 F. Supp. 69, 71-72 (E.D. Tenn.
1964), relying upon West.
235. People v. Montoya, 63 Cal. Rptr. 73, 77 n.5 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967),
cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. 1255 (1968). For a similar rule applicable to the
execution of search warrants, see notes 53-58 supra and accompanying text.
It could be reasonably argued that the constitutional prohibition of the

"Richard Roe" description is inadequate. 23 6 It will not be saved by
resort to the supporting affidavit if the latter is not attached to or
incorporated by reference into the warrant; 237 nor will it be saved
by the warrant charging the commission of an offense at a designated place. 238
On the other hand, a "John Doe" warrant, describing the subject physically and stating that he is also known as "Piggy," is
adequate. 23 9 Where, however, a "John Doe" warrant, supplies a
physical description limited to the characteristics of weight, height,
age, and race, states no address, and makes no reference to aliases,
2 40
it will not satisfy the requirements of particularity.
Finally, if an arrest warrant is issued specifying where the
subject is to be located, the place specified may have a bearing on
the adequacy of description for the person to be apprehended. For
example, if the place is open to the general public and is situated in
a densely populated area, a warrant will be required to describe the
person to be apprehended with the highest degree of specificity,
2 41
especially where the subject's name is unknown.

general warrant would be satisfied if a particular person inadequately or
inaccurately described was in fact intended. And, in resolving this issue a
court should be permitted a reasonable inquiry of the knowledge and intent of either the issuing or executing officer in determining whether a
particular person was intended, and if so, who he was. But this will not be
sanctioned. United States v. Swanner, 237 F. Supp. 69, 71-72 (E.D. Tenn.
1964), interpreting West as foreclosing such an inquiry.
236. United States v. Swanner, 237 F. Supp. 69, 71 (E.D. Tenn. 1964);
United States v. Doe, 127 F. 982, 983-84 (N.D. Calif. 1904) (dictum); People
v. States, 235 N.E.2d 882, 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Commonwealth v. Crotty,
92 Mass. (10 Allen) 403, 404, 405 (1865); People v. Brown, 40 Misc. 2d 35,
43, 242 N.Y.S.2d 555, 564 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1963); Winters v. Campbell,
148 W. Va. 710, 717-18, 137 S.E.2d 188, 192 (1964). Such a warrant is for
an unknown or nonexistent person. Garner v. State, 423 S.W.2d 480, 482
(Tenn. 1968).
237. See People v. Staes, 235 N.E.2d 882, 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (applying the rule to a "John Doe" search warrant).
238. Winters v. Campbell, 148 W. Va. 710, 718, 137 S.E.2d 188, 193, 194
(1964).
239. United States v. $1,058.00 In United States Currency, 210 F. Supp.
45, 49 (W.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 323 F.2d 211, 213 (3d Cir.
1963); accord, Wilson v. State, 200 Md. 187, 189, 88 A.2d 564, 565, 566 (1952)
(a warrant for an unnamed person, but otherwise designated as "a white
man . . . about five feet, nine inches in height, about 180 pounds in
weight and about forty years of age [who is known to the affiant as, or
has been called, Whitey]"). For further examples of "John Doe" or
"Richard Roe" warrants that listed adequate physical descriptions, and
otherwise, see United States v. Interbartolo, 192 F. Supp. 587, 589, 590
(D. Mass. 1961).
240. E.g., People v. Montoya, 63 Cal. Rptr. 73, 77 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967),
cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. 1255 (1968) (a "White male adult, 30 to 35 years
5' 10", 175 lbs. dark hair medium build"); Martini v. State, 200 Md. 609,
611, 92 A.2d 456, 457 (1952) (dictum) (a "white man being about 25 yrs. of
age").
241. See People v. Brown, 40 Misc. 2d 35, 42-43, 242 N.Y.S.2d 555,
563-64 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1963).
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CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made herein to acquaint both the peace
officer and the practitioner with the standard of specificity demanded for warrants under the fourth amendment. Unless this
standard is comprehended, an effective law enforcement tool will
be severely crippled. This can only result in the freeing of criminals who would otherwise be brought to book-"an outcome which,
involved, scarcely aids in the prowhile helpful to the criminal
''24 2
justice.
true
of
motion
In like manner, a thorough understanding by the practitioner
of the standard demanded will assist him in rendering effective
danger to
protection to his client against the clear and present
243
human liberty posed by the insidious general warrant.

242. People v. Hendricks, 45 Misc. 2d 7, 12, 256 N.Y.S.2d 78, 84 (Sup.
Ct. 1965).
243. E.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967); Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948); United States v. Wroblewski, 105
F.2d 444, 446-47 (7th Cir. 1939).

